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Civil Conspiracy:
What's the Use?
THOMAS J. LEACH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Any lawyer, given a few moments to think about it, could offer a
reasonably correct definition of civil conspiracy. She would say it
involves an agreement or combination. Extrapolating from the criminal
context, she would probably formulate a phrase to convey the object of
the agreement: something like "to do an unlawful act." If pressed for
explanation, she would probably come to the point of realizing that the
"unlawful act" is most likely to be a recognized tort. She might refine
the definition in light of the requirement of an "agreement," which
imports intent, to confine the applicability to intentional torts.
Such a definition of civil conspiracy satisfactorily matches the
usual formulation found in the cases and texts: "The essence of conspir-
acy is an agreement - together with an overt act - to do an unlawful act,
or a lawful act in an unlawful manner."'
* Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I
gratefully acknowledge the assistance of many colleagues and students who added much to my
work on this article. A senior independent project by Melinda Levy-Storms formed the basis for
substantial portions of the historical section; research assistance was provided by Josh Brownstein,
Mike Cable, Cynthia De Silva, Amy Hall, Laura O'Kane, Jason Runckel, and McGeorge's superb
staff of research librarians; Professors Joshua Dressier, Julie Davies, Frank Gevurtz, Kathleen
Kelly, Brian Landsberg, Larry Levine, Joseph Taylor, and Michael Vitiello provided many helpful
comments. I thank my partners and colleagues at Drinker Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, for
training me as a trial lawyer and launching me then on a teaching career; and David Sonenshein
and Tony Bocchino of Temple Law School for encouraging me to turn left at Greenland. Finally,
with gratitude running back to antiquity (although not quite as far back as Savile v. Roberts, see
infra), during my clerkship with him at the beginning of my legal career I was happily infected
with Judge Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr.'s enthusiasm for the law as a constantly developing instrument
for bettering the human condition.
I. Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1938). While the phrase "to do an
unlawful act" seems easy enough to understand as referring to recognized torts, the meaning of the
phrase "to do a lawful act in an unlawful manner" is more opaque. See infra pp. 12-14.
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But if we ask, instead, what is the use of the concept of civil con-
spiracy, the going gets more difficult. To be sure, anyone with a nod-
ding acquaintance with the Federal Rules of Evidence' or state
equivalents3 will say that a civil conspiracy, if substantiated by sufficient
foundational proof, invokes the co-conspirator exemption from the rule
against hearsay. However, this seems a slim, narrow use for such a
broad, weighty notion as "conspiracy." The inquirer's further research
would disclose that, in narrow instances, the concept may provide a
means for the imposition of joint liability in instances where the actor
characterized as a co-conspirator might not otherwise be liable as a joint
tortfeasor, and that it may be argued to support a jurisdictional advan-
tage over non-residents who, if not characterized as co-conspirators,
would otherwise be beyond the reach of a state's long-arm statute
(although the advantages of such an application may be illusory). Still,
it seems there ought to be more than procedural and joint liability
aspects to a civil conspiracy claim. Cannot a plaintiff get more substan-
tively out of his case by alleging and proving a civil conspiracy?
The short answer, based on cases going back to the seventeenth-
century, is "no." "Since liability for civil conspiracy depends on per-
formance of some underlying tortious act, the conspiracy is not indepen-
dently actionable; rather, it is a means for establishing vicarious liability
for the underlying tort."4
Thus, civil conspiracy sits in a neatly wrapped but very small pack-
age, useful in relatively few circumstances and subject to a substantial
number of limitations. This article suggests that, as limited by common-
law rulings of 300 years, the concept of civil conspiracy is relatively
useless, given that it applies to so few situations that are not addressed
by other concepts of joint liability or by statutory enactments designed
to address what legislatures have deemed the areas most in need of
relief, e.g., antitrust and RICO. With this background, this article exam-
ines whether the concept of civil conspiracy has any broader continuing
utility, aside from (1) the sole evidentiary advantage, (2) as a means of
adding defendants who may be jointly liable, and (3) the limited juris-
dictional use.
This article argues that the concept should have added and renewed
vitality for two purposes. First, a stand-alone action for civil conspiracy
ought to be considered as a means of sanctioning and preventing types
2. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) (treating admissions of co-conspirators as non-hearsay
statements).
3. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1223(a) (1995) (making admissions of co-conspirators
exceptions to the rule against hearsay); N.J. R. EvID. 803(b)(5) (1994) (excepting from the
hearsay rule statements made by co-conspirators).
4. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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of anti-social behavior that are not sufficiently addressed by other tort
causes of action or statutory schemes. By analogy to the doctrine of
criminal law that permits prosecution of conspiracy to commit a crime
although the planned crime is never committed, this argument suggests
that a cause of action for civil conspiracy similarly should be permitted
in situations where the tort that is conspired to be committed is never
actually completed, but where, because of the seriousness of the type of
activity contemplated, society (speaking through the courts or legisla-
tures) deems the conspiracy one that should be discouraged by the avail-
ability of a civil remedy. Two hypothetical uses are offered as
examples: (1) a scheme among tobacco manufacturers to enhance the
addictive nature of their products and to conceal such facts from the
public,5 and (2) a carefully planned, jointly organized system of residen-
tial burglaries, including surveillance of the target premises and tracking
and shadowing of the target owners' movements and habits.6 In such
cases, the anti-social intent of civil conspiracies is flagrant enough to
warrant preventive action. A cause of action premised on such conspira-
cies would fill a significant gap in the ability of tort law to provide
remedies against the threatened harm.
In the tobacco industry hypothetical, for example, contrast the use
of a stand-alone conspiracy theory with the general lack of success of
private plaintiffs' suits against the industry over the past forty-five
years.7 With only a handful of exceptions, these suits by private plain-
tiffs have foundered on the defenses of assumption of the risk and con-
tributory/comparative negligence.' Although state-government suits
have begun to yield settlements for health-care costs, even those results
may have little exemplary effect on the outlook and attitude of the
tobacco industry.9 The availability of a stand-alone cause of action for
conspiracy could have a much better chance of success than the plain-
5. This "hypothetical" is, of course, based on similar allegations that have been made in the
tobacco-industry litigation. To the extent the underlying facts remain to be proved in each
individual case, it is appropriate to continue to treat the scenario as hypothetical.
6. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 472.
7. This section takes information generally from Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A.
Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 63 (1997), except where otherwise noted. See also Robert L. Rabin, A
Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1992); Christine
Hatfield, Note & Comment, The Privilege Doctrines - Are They Just Another Discovery Tool
Utilized by the Tobacco Industry to Conceal Damaging Information?, 16 PACE L. REV. 525
(1996).
8. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 7, at 64, 70. Plaintiffs' causes of action also have been
limited by the Supreme Court's ruling that certain claims are preempted by the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA). See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
9. See, e.g., Eric Brazil, $206 Billion Tobacco Deal, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Nov. 15,
1998, at Al.
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tiffs' suits to date and a more minatory influence than the settlements in
the government actions. More importantly, the use of a preventive cause
of action for conspiracy could avoid a significant portion of personal
injuries and health-care costs for which plaintiffs and state governments
are now trying to recover.
Substantively, a stand-alone action for conspiracy can free plaintiffs
from the constraints of the affirmative defenses of assumption of risk
and contributory/comparative negligence. These defenses apply to
defeat claims based on negligence.1° In a stand-alone action for conspir-
acy, the basis of the cause of action would be the defendants' intentional
agreement to perform a tortious act. Because the claim would not sound
in negligence, these affirmative defenses would not apply. 1
But it is the preventive capability of a stand-alone cause of action
for conspiracy that most distinguishes it from and makes it preferable to
the current arsenal of legal weapons at plaintiffs' disposal. Tort law
requires that there be damage before there can be recovery. Thus, tradi-
tional tort suits cannot prevent the initial damage, but only, by means of
the imposition of substantial compensatory and punitive damages, warn
the tortfeasor of the potential costs of such tortious actions in the
future. ' 2
Consider the situation of a plaintiff who sues the tobacco industry.
In a field of damage as sweepingly broad as that of the effects of tobacco
use, the societal and personal costs are huge. 13 In recent news, a San
Francisco jury awarded plaintiff Patricia Henley $1.5 million in compen-
satory damages and $50 million in punitive damages."i Unfortunately,
these monetary damages did not change this successful plaintiffs health
prognosis, which is terminal. 15 If, however, the law had allowed a suit
for an unexecuted' 6 conspiracy within the tobacco industry to enhance
the addictive qualities of their product, to suppress research into the
10. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451,
§§ 67-68, at 458 (5th ed. 1984).
11. A stand-alone action for conspiracy would likely also be free from any restraint of the
Supreme Court's findings of preemption, as the claim would sound in intentional fraud. See
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527-29. The Court specifically found no preemption of claims sounding in
conspiracy, id. at 530; but, as we shall see later in this article, that finding would give plaintiffs no
meaningful substantive advantage unless the law concerning the availability of a stand-alone
action for conspiracy is changed.
12. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, at § 4, at 25-26.
13. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 7, at 64.
14. See Milo Geyelin, Jury Awards $50 Million to Ex-Smoker, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1999, at
A3.
15. Patricia Jacobus, Terminally Ill Smoker Wins $1.5 Million, SAN FRANCISCO DAILY J., Feb.
10, 1999, at Al (reported the day before the jury returned additional award of $50 million in
punitive damages).
16. As discussed infra, "unexecuted conspiracy" means a conspiracy that has not yet been
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addictive and harmful nature of smoking, and to suppress dissemination
of such information (as was alleged and, apparently, proved to the jury's
satisfaction in the Henley case), then there would have been an incen-
tive, both for whistle-blowers and attorneys, to bring a preventive type
of action as early as the 1950s and 1960s, when the industry's conspir-
acy allegedly began. If such an action had been successful, it could have
restrained the industry's actions and could have prevented millions of
cancer-related deaths and significant health costs. As a trial attorney
might put it to a jury, "Today, instead of knowing that she faces a certain
and early death, Patricia Henley would be enjoying life fully, without
fear and without the agonizing pain of cancer."
There may be disagreement with the hypothesized results of such a
scenario. Such contentions do not contradict the central point of this
article: a stand-alone action for civil conspiracy can potentially regulate
and control anti-social actions more effectively than tort-based, after-
the-fact damages suits.
The second purpose for a renewed use, or at least reinvigoration, of
the concept of civil conspiracy is its usefulness as a tool for jury persua-
sion. Inclusion of a claim of civil conspiracy may substantially enhance
the advocate's ability to persuade a jury of the outrageous nature of the
defendants' conduct, thereby increasing the jury's inclination to award
significant compensatory and punitive damages. Without the pleading
of conspiracy, the "sell" will be harder and the impact of the case
weaker. 17
II. THE ORIGINS OF CIVIL CONSPIRACY
A. The English History
Between the Norman Conquest in 1066 and the reign of Edward I,
crime in England was abundant.'" The civil authorities sought to main-
tain social order, but due to tremendous social unrest during this time -
civil war, outlaws who threatened life and property and made travel dan-
gerous - such a balance was difficult to attain. Because enforcement
carried out to the point of damages done, even though there may have been steps taken towards
completion of the conspiracy (i.e., the required "overt act").
17. This notion of enhanced jury persuasion is largely based on observations of jury
deliberations at the close of student-tried cases in trial advocacy classes at McGeorge School of
Law and in programs of the National Institute for Trial Advocacy.
18. Except where noted otherwise, the following historical overview relies on the work of
JAMES WALLACE BRYAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONSPIRACY (Da Capo
Press ed. 1970) (1909). For a more detailed history, see PERCY HENRY WINFIELD, THE HISTORY
OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE (Cambridge University Press 1921). For a
more truncated overview, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4
(2d ed. 1986).
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resources were stretched thin, the primary focus was to punish actual
wrongdoers. There was not enough time or manpower to pursue the
punishment of those who intended, but did not accomplish, a wrong.
Before the time of Edward I, the concept of the wrong of conspiracy
"was limited to combinations [of persons] whose object was to hinder or
pervert the administration of justice."' 9 The administration of justice
helped maintain social order, so any attempts to interfere with it were
viewed as further disturbances of social balance punishable at criminal
common law. As criminal law predominated during this time, if any
actions for civil conspiracy did occur, they remained undocumented.2 °
Before the reign of Edward I, no formal definition of conspiracy or
its civil remedy existed. During his reign, the Ordinance of Conspira-
tors,21 the first of three important conspiracy statutes, was passed in
1293.22 This statute provided a remedy against "conspirators, inventors
and maintainers of false quarrels and their abettors and supporters and
having part therein, and brokers of debates. '23 The statute failed to
define the elements of the offenses for which the remedy was provided.
Although this statute did not contain a definition of conspiracy or con-
spirator, its purpose - as Bryan puts it, "to provide a civil action in the
royal courts for damages caused by the acts of unlawful combinations of
malefactors ' 24 - was clear. The Articuli Super Chartas,25 passed in
211305, was "no more specific in its mention of 'conspirators, false
informers, and evil procurers of dozens, assizes, inquests and juries.' -27
The first statute to define "conspirator" and to codify common
law28 was the Definition of Conspirators, which stated, "Conspirators be
they that do confeder or bind themselves by Oath, Covenant, or other
Alliance, that every of them shall aid and support the Enterprise of each
other falsely and maliciously to indite, or cause to be indited or falsely to
acquit people, or falsely to move or maintain Pleas. 29
These statutes codified pre-existing principles of common law
relating to unlawful combinations and provided a "suitable procedure for
19. BRYAN, supra note 18, at 11.
20. See id. at 13 (observing that the ancient records refer only to criminal, as opposed to civil,
conspiracy).
21. 21 Edw.
22. Cf BRYAN, supra note 18, at 15.
23. See id. at 9 (quoting Ordinance of Conspirators, 21 Edw.).
24. BRYAN, supra note 18, at 17.
25. 28 Edw., ch. 10.
26. See 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF ENGLAND AND OF GREAT-BRITAIN: FROM MAGNA
CARTA TO THE UNION OF THE KINGDOMS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND 292 (1811).
27. BRYAN, supra note 18, at 9-10 (quoting Articuli Super Chartas, 28 Edw., ch. 10).
28. See BRYAN, supra note 18, at 18 (asserting that the Definition of Conspirators was the
first statutory definition of "conspirator").
29. 1305, 33 Edw.
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the trial and punishment of conspirators"3 in the civil context. The
courts used these as a vantage point from which to further develop the
law of conspiracy over the next 200 years.31
By the time of Henry VII (1485), one could bring an action by writ
of conspiracy upon acquittal after a false indictment by conspirators or
in the case of "a false appeal in which the plaintiff had been non-suit
[sic]."3 2 Defects in the administration of this law soon became apparent.
For example, false indictments brought by a single individual were not
reachable under the Definition of Conspirators.33 To correct the short-
comings of the statute, judges remolded the application of the law into a
new remedy called "malicious prosecution."34
Malicious prosecution was an action on the case "in the nature of a
conspiracy."35 Improvements in the cause of action developed over the
next 250 years (1485-1726).36 The new approach expanded the law to
allow actions against single parties, actions without an acquittal by ver-
dict, and actions for all false accusations.37 The development of "prob-
able cause," a required element that provided a defense against a charge
of malicious prosecution if the defense could show sufficient reason to
have brought the original charge, limited this expansion.38 The doctrine
of probable cause acted to discourage the frivolous and retributory use
of this cause of action by newly acquitted defendants. As the doctrine of
probable cause developed, so did the importance of the requirement of
malice as an element of the action.3 9 During the development of these
two concepts, it became clear that a lack of probable cause was "a more
or less accurate test or measure of malice .. "40 The emphasis on the
element of malice increased the credibility of the claim and attracted the
attention of lawyers who wanted to correct the wrong caused by the
malicious party.4 1
The development of the new action on the case of malicious prose-
cution expanded the law of civil conspiracy to such an extent that it no
longer resembled the strict form of the action of conspiracy.42 The
30. BRYAN, supra note 18, at 22.
31. See id. at 21-22.
32. Id. at 23.
33. See id. at 27.
34. Id. at 27-28.
35. Id. at 28.
36. See id. at 30.
37. See id. at 30-36.
38. Id. at 36.
39. See, e.g., Savile v. Roberts, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1150 (1698) (recognizing malice as an
element of the claim for civil conspiracy in a false indictment cause of action).
40. BRYAN, supra note 18, at 43.
41. See id. at 38.
42. See id. at 45-46.
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strict, or old, form of an action of conspiracy was limited to the "illegal
combination" itself. This required only a mental commitment and no
action by the conspirators. As a result, there often was no damage or
injury, and this left no maintainable cause of action. In what has long
since been taken as the authoritative statement on the nature and scope
of a claim of civil conspiracy, Chief Justice Holt emphasized, in Savile
v. Roberts,a3 that malice and damages were the two primary elements for
an action on the case for malicious prosecution. He extended this same
observation to his remarks on the requirements for recovery on a claim
for conspiracy.4 4 Chief Justice Holt's observations in Savile are gener-
ally viewed, by the many cases relying on that decision,45 as broad in
their reach and dispositive of any lingering confusion concerning the
precise import of a claim for conspiracy, which was so often added to a
suit for malicious prosecution. Thus, Bryan writes:
These two cases [Savile and Jones v. Gwynn,46 which reaffirmed the
points made in Savile] mark the culmination of the long process
whereby the courts had been gradually unfolding the basic principles
relating to the action upon the case for malicious prosecution as it
exists today. The courts clearly and authoritatively announced that
not conspiracy, but damages flowing from the malice of the defend-
ant, are essential requisites for recovery. The old action of conspir-
acy was not in terms declared obsolete. But the action upon the case
was so broadened in its scope that it became available to redress not
only wrongs beyond the operation of the older remedy, but also torts
which the old action might still reach; and in competition with the
new form of action the action of conspiracy immediately
succumbed.a7
Today, English law provides remedies for both criminal and civil
conspiracy. As Clerk and Lindsell note, the Criminal Law Act of 1977
abolished common-law conspiracy except with regard to "conspiracy to
defraud, to corrupt public morals or to outrage public decency; the crime
of conspiracy otherwise rests upon the agreement to pursue conduct
which involves the commission of a criminal [offense]." 48 A civil con-
spiracy comprises a tortious act involving an "agreement of two or more
to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means."49 The
43. 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 (1698).
44. See BRYAN, supra note 18, at 47-49 (citing Savile v. Roberts, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 (1698)).
45. See infra Part IV.A.1-4 (discussing Savile and its progeny).
46. 10 Mod. 148, 214 (K.B. 1713).
47. BRYAN, supra note 18, at 49.
48. J.F. CLERK & W.H.B. LINDSELL, CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS § 23-76, at 1268 n.2 (17th
ed. 1995).
49. Id. § 23-76, at 1267 (quoting Mulcahy v. The Queen, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 306, 317
(1868)).
[Vol. 54:1
CIVIL CONSPIRACY
crime of conspiracy and the tort of conspiracy, while originating from
similar concepts, are very different. The crime is the agreement to act
unlawfully; but the tort occurs only with damage from the agreement.5 0
B. The American History
American tort law is a direct descendent of English tort law con-
cepts. Its concepts are traceable to the rise of the system of royal courts
in England after the Norman Conquest in 1066.5 As American jurispru-
dence developed, its reference to English case law was so frequent that it
resembled more an extension than a separate body of law. 52 Accord-
ingly, it is not surprising that American jurisprudence recites the general
outlines of English law on the subject of civil conspiracy, including the
principle that there is no recovery for conspiracy alone without a com-
pleted, underlying tort.
As in English jurisprudence, civil conspiracy is not independently
actionable and requires more than mere agreement.53 Civil conspiracy
requires the performance of some underlying tortious act. No matter
how atrocious, conspiracy itself does not give rise to a civil cause of
action unless a tort has been committed and that tort results in damage.54
The American case of Adler v. Fenton 51 incorporated the damage
requirement into American tort law over 130 years ago, importing it
directly from the Savile case.56 In 1936, Judge Learned Hand observed
that "[w]hatever may be the rule in criminal conspiracies, it is well set-
tled that the civil liability does not depend upon the confederation...,
but upon the acts committed in realization of the common purpose.
Damages remain a distinguishing requirement of civil conspiracy today.
One significant way in which American law departs from British is
that American courts have been much less accepting of the concept of a
50. See CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 48, § 23-76, at 1268 (citing Mulcany) (internal
footnote omitted).
51. See G. William Rice, Of Cold Steel and Blueprints: Musings of an Old Country Lawyer
on Crime, Jurisprudence, and the Tribal Attorney's Role in Developing Tribal Sovereignty, 1997
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31, 41 (recounting the emerging law of tort "[o]n the eve of the Norman
Conquest").
52. See id. at 45 (noting that the early Americans brought their English common law concepts
with them and proceeded "according to their rights as English people").
53. See West v. Carson, 49 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1995).
54. See Schick v. Bach, 238 Cal. Rptr. 902 (Ct. App. 1987).
55. 65 U.S. 407 (1860).
56. See id. at 410 (citing Savile for the proposition that damage must result if a claim for civil
conspiracy is to be maintained).
57. Lewis Invisible Stitch Mach. Co. v. Columbia Blindstitch Mach. Mfg. Corp., 80 F.2d 862,
864 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.). While Judge Hand did not in haec verba make clear the distinction
between overt acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy, which would not be actionable without
more, and the requirement of damages, the cases he cited show he was referring to the latter.
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cause of action based on "a legal act by illegal means." The British
courts refer to this cause of action as "conspiracy to injure." They
describe it as based on situations where the defendants "employ no acts
or means that are in themselves unlawful," but their motive was willfully
to injure the plaintiff.58 The doctrine developed in England during the
trade and union disputes of the nineteenth century as a means of limiting
rights and responsibilities under the new pressures of the Industrial
Age.5
9
In the seminal case of Quinn v. Leathem,60 the House of Lords
described the tort of civil conspiracy as follows: "[A] conspiracy to
injure might give rise to civil liability even though the end was brought
about by conduct and acts which by themselves . . . could not be
regarded as a legal wrong."'"
The case of Sorrel v. Smith,62 gave this somewhat formless pro-
nouncement more definition. It stated:
(1.) A combination of two or more persons wilfully to injure a man
in his trade is unlawful and, if it results in damage to him, is
actionable.
(2.) If the real purpose of the combination is, not to injure another,
but to forward or defend the trade of those who enter into it, then no
wrong is committed and no action will lie, although damage to
another ensues.63
Only a few American jurisdictions have recognized this separate tort of
"conspiracy to injure.'' 64 The majority have held that "[m]ere numbers
58. CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 48, §§ 23-85, at 1282.
59. Jerry Whitson, Note, Civil Conspiracy: A Substantive Tort?, 59 B.U. L. REv. 921, 923-24
(1979).
60. [1901] App. Cas. 495 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Ir.).
61. [1901] App. Cas. at 510.
62. [1925] App. Cas. 700 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
63. [1925] A.C. at 712. Whether this seemingly simple formulation provides much real
guidance as to the use of the "tort" has been questioned. See G.J. Hughes, The Tort of
Conspiracy, 15 MoD. L. REV. 209 (1952).
64. Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Oregon, and
Tennessee have, to some degree, acknowledged the tort of "conspiracy to injure" or, as it is more
typically termed in American usage, "true conspiracy." See cases collected at Note, supra note
59, at 926 n.44.
The American cases generally define "true conspiracy" as "a cause of action which involves
more than a mere joint tort and the gist of which consists in the combination itself making
unlawful a course of conduct that might not give rise to liability if carried on by a single
individual." Fleming v. Dane, 22 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Mass. 1939). Moreover:
There can be no independent tort for conspiracy unless in a situation "where mere
force of numbers acting in unison or other exceptional circumstances may make a
wrong.."... And in order to prove an independent tort for conspiracy upon the basis
of "mere force of numbers acting in unison," it must be shown that there was some
"peculiar power of coercion of the plaintiff possessed by the defendants in
[Vol. 54:1
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cannot convert lawful into unlawful acts."65
In a general sense, the recognition of this separate tort of "conspir-
acy to injure" is tangential to the purposes of this article, in that the
article calls for the recognition of a separate cause of action for an unex-
ecuted conspiracy to commit a recognized tort, as opposed to an exe-
cuted conspiracy to do together what would not be actionable if done by
only one actor. In one respect, the acceptance - albeit limited in Ameri-
can jurisdictions - of the concept of a legitimate action based on conspir-
acy to do what otherwise would be lawful supports the argument for a
stand-alone action for conspiracy. This point is addressed further in Part
IV.A.6.
III. CURRENT USES OF CIVIL CONSPIRACY
When the case law in which civil conspiracy has been shown to be
useful is canvassed, three generally recognized uses for it emerge. First,
it is a basis for an exemption from the hearsay rule. Second, civil con-
spiracy may be useful as a means of imposing vicarious liability on
actors not at center stage. Finally, it may be used as a means of
obtaining long-arm jurisdiction over defendants arguably not otherwise
subject to the reach of the long-arm statute. However, consideration of
the case law also suggests that these are not always, or even predomi-
nantly, the reasons that a claim of civil conspiracy is introduced into a
case. Instead, it appears that plaintiffs include it out of instinct. Com-
mon sense and analysis of the cases suggest that such instinct should be
constrained by more analytical thought. This would allow a plaintiff to
persuasively argue the case and to avoid the impression that the plain-
tiff's case was brought, formulated, and pleaded by an ass.66
combination which any individual standing in a like relation to the plaintiff would
not have had."
DesLauries v. Shea, 13 N.E.2d 932, 935 (Mass. 1938) (citations omitted).
See also Leonard A. Washofsky, Note, Offenses and Quasi-Offenses-Conspiracy-Civil
Action for "True Conspiracy," 33 TUL. L. REV. 410, 412-13 (1959) (noting that a "true conspir-
acy" arises when the motivation behind the actions is unlawful, but the actions themselves are
lawful); see, e.g., Willett v. Herrick, 136 N.E. 366, 369 (Mass. 1922) (overruling a demurrer even
though the defendant's objectives were not shown to be unlawful, because a conspiracy to attain
those objectives would be tortious); Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch, 1942 App.
Cas. 435, 447 (appeal taken from Scot.) (finding no conspiracy despite resulting damage when the
object of the agreement (to impose an embargo) was not unlawful, because the purpose behind it
was "to secure economic stability").
65. Washofsky, supra note 64, at 413. See cases collected at Note, supra note 59, at 926 nn.
41 & 43.
66. See Estate of Wilson v. Aiken Indus., Inc., 439 U.S. 877, 880 n. 3 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (expressing fear that the populace may agree with Mr. Bumble's assertion in Charles
Dickens's OLIVER TwIST that "the law is a ass-a idiot").
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A. Evidentiary Use
The exemption from the hearsay rule codified by Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) applies equally to civil and criminal conspira-
cies.6 7 State common law and codifications generally allow the same
provision.68 The application of the exemption does not generally raise
significant problems or subtleties. The questions that commonly arise
are: the degree of proof of the conspiracy required before the exemption
will be allowed; 69 the exact scope of the requirement that the statement
sought to be admitted be "in furtherance of the conspiracy";7" and (until
the 1998 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), which
settled the point) whether the statement that is sought to be admitted is
itself sufficient as a foundation for admissibility.7 There is no question
that the conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and that
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard applies7 2 (although a
minority of states set the required proof at "clear and convincing").73
Because this is perhaps the most common use of a claim of civil conspir-
67. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Compare United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 986
(6th Cir. 1978) (holding that, in the criminal law context, a preponderance of the evidence
standard applies in deciding whether to admit an alleged co-conspirator's admission), with James
R. Snyder Co. v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc., 677 F.2d 1111, 1117 (6th Cir. 1982)
(extending the Enright rule to civil conspiracies).
68. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 1223(a) (1995) (exempting co-conspirator statements from
the hearsay rule in both the criminal and civil contexts); N.J. R. oF EvIo. 803(b)(5) (1994)
(providing that the hearsay exception for co-conspirator statements applies in civil as well as
criminal proceedings); Mo. R. oF Evio. 5-803(a)(5) (1996) (providing that co-conspirator
statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule); Daugherty v. Kessler, 286 A.2d 95, 101 (Md.
1972) (allowing Maryland's co-conspirator hearsay exception to be applied in a civil conspiracy
action).
69. Compare Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (holding that a proponent
must meet the preponderance standard before a co-conspirator statement may be admitted
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)), with James R. Snyder Co., 677 F.2d at 1111
(discussing the conflict regarding whether to apply a mere prima facie standard, the more
demanding preponderance standard, or the stringent reasonable doubt standard).
70. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175 (requiring the trial court to find whether the statement was
made "in furtherance of the conspiracy" by a preponderance of the evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and quoting same rule).
71. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 180 (declining to decide whether a trial court may rely solely
on a hearsay statement for the purpose of determining whether a conspiracy existed, but
recognizing that a court may at least consider the statement).
72. See Fink v. Sheridan Bank of Lawton, 259 F. Supp. 899, 903 (W.D. Okla. 1966) ("The
burden of proof is upon a plaintiff in a civil conspiracy case to prove the conspiracy by a
preponderance of the evidence. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for this purpose."); see
also United Elec. Coal Co. v. Rice, 22 F. Supp. 221, 226 (E.D. II1. 1938) (holding that
preponderance of the standard applies to prove damages from a civil conspiracy).
73. See, e.g., National Rejectors, Inc. v. Thrombin, 409 S.W.2d 1, 50 (Mo. 1966) (recognizing
the Missouri rule that proof of conspiracies must rise to the level of clear and convincing
evidence, but may be proved by circumstantial evidence); Quackenbush v. Slate, 121 P.2d 331,
333 (Wash. 1942) (holding that, in Washington, one must prove the elements of conspiracy by
clear and convincing evidence).
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acy, the application of the exemption from the hearsay rule has been
commented on extensively.74
B. Joint Liability Use
[A] civil conspiracy ... may form a predicate for the establish-
ment of multiple tort liability .... The concept of civil conspiracy is
sometimes used by an injured plaintiff as a basis for establishing
joint and several tort liability among several parties. To be distin-
guished from the concept of vicarious liability for concerted action,
civil conspiracy "came to be used to extend liability in tort ...
beyond the active wrongdoer to those who have merely planned,
assisted, or encouraged his acts. Once a conspiracy is proven, each
co-conspirator 'is responsible for all acts done by any of the conspira-
tors in furtherance of the unlawful combination.' ,75
The major significance of a conspiracy cause of action 'lies in
the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible
as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespec-
tive of whether or not he was a direct actor and regardless of the
degree of his activity.' 76
The use of a conspiracy theory to impose liability is often confused
with the similar concepts of joint tortfeasor liability and aider-abettor
liability. Arguably the advantage of the choice of a conspiracy theory,
in contrast to joint tortfeasorship or aiding and abetting, is that the co-
conspirator generally need not be shown to have performed or contrib-
uted substantial assistance to a tortious act that caused the plaintiff's
injury in order to be found liable.77 It must be noted, however, that even
the courts have difficulty separating the concepts; thus, the advantage
74. See, e.g., Steven M. Kowal, Applying the Co-Conspirator Rule in a Sherman Act
Prosecution, 1991 ANrIRUST 26; Ethel R. Alston, Annotation, Admissibility of Statement by Co-
Conspirator Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of Federal Rules of Evidence, 44 A.L.R. FED. 627 (1979);
Todd R. Russell & 0. Carter Snead, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 739
(1998); Robert Humphreys, In Search of the Reliable Conspirator: A Proposed Amendment to
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 337 (1993); Frederic L. Borch 111,
The Use of Co-Conspirator Statements Under the Rules of Evidence: A Revolutionary Change in
Admissibility, 124 MIL. L. REV. 163 (1989).
75. 1 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 3:4, at 386-87 (1983)
(quoting Carroll v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 922, 925-26 (Tex. 1979)).
76. Howard v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 576 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Mox Inc. v.
Woods, 262 P. 302, 303 (Cal. 1927)).
77. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Proving a conspiracy
theory may be more difficult than proving an aiding-and-abetting theory because finding direct or
sufficient circumstantial evidence of an agreement often presents significant challenges.
Additionally, circumstantial evidence of "agreement" is likely to be found primarily in the kind of
supportive acts that would also establish a finding of aiding-and-abetting. Each set of facts
elucidates whether these are real or illusory advantages and/or difficulties. Thus, it is important
that the framer of the lawsuit understand the distinction between the two theories, so as to identify
the advantages and disadvantages within the facts presented.
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may be lost in the confusion.78
Additionally, proof of a conspiracy may expose deep-pocket
defendants to more liability than an aiding and abetting theory. Under
conspiracy theory, all conspirators are held liable for the damages
caused by any one of them, regardless of whether or to what extent they
participated in the acts that directly caused the damages. In contrast,
under an aiding-and-abetting theory, the aider and abettor is held liable
for the damages caused by the acts of the main perpetrator, but not the
other way around.79 It is possible to posit circumstances in which the
aider and abettor's acts may have caused the significant damages, but
the deep pockets belong to the main perpetrator. In such a case, under
an aiding-and-abetting theory, the plaintiff would not have an adequate
source for payment of the damages.
C. Jurisdictional Use
Some jurisdictions allow a plaintiff to use a conspiracy theory to
support the court's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants, provided the court has personal jurisdiction over at least one
conspirator.80 Persuasive arguments exist that this appearance of a sepa-
rately useful basis for finding extraterritorial jurisdictional reach is illu-
sory.8' If the extraterritorial defendant's contacts with the jurisdiction
78. See id. at 478 n.9.
79. See id. at 478.
80. See ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS [ 7.09[3], at 7-73 (1983); see
generally Stuart M. Riback, The Long Arm and Multiple Defendants: The Conspiracy Theory of ln
Personam Jurisdiction, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 506 (1984) (discussing the "conspiracy theory of
jurisdiction" as an independent basis by which a court may obtain personal jurisdiction over co-
conspirators); Textor v. Board of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 711 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (7th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing the "conspiracy theory of jurisdiction" but holding that the plaintiffs failed to state an
actionable conspiracy); Gemini Enters., Inc. v. WMFY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 565
(M.D.N.C. 1979) (applying the "conspiracy theory of jurisdiction" to extend the long-arm statute
to the defendants). But see Mansour v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 191, 197 (Ct. App. 1995)
("California does not recognize conspiracy as a basis for acquiring personal jurisdiction over a
party."); Allen v. Columbia Fin. Management, Ltd., 377 S.E.2d 352, 357 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988)
("We decline to attribute the contacts of one alleged conspirator to another alleged conspirator.");
National Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. 1995) (declining to recognize
the "conspiracy theory of jurisdiction" as a basis for personal jurisdiction in Texas). Note, too, that
there is a split among Florida appellate courts on this issue. Compare Wilcox v. Stout, 637 So. 2d
335, 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that a claim of conspiracy to commit tortious acts supports
long-arm jurisdiction), with Execu-tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New OJI Paper Co., 708 So. 2d 599, 600
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (disagreeing with Wilcox and holding that assertion of the "conspiracy theory
of jurisdiction" will be sustained only when plaintiff shows: (1) a conspiracy existed; "(2) the
defendant was a member of that conspiracy; (3) a substantial act or substantial effect in
furtherance of the conspiracy occurred in the forum state;" (4) the defendant knew or should have
known of the acts in or effects on the forum state; and (5) such acts or effects were "a direct and
foreseeable result" of the actions in furtherance of the conspiracy).
81. See Riback, supra note 80, at 510-11.
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do not satisfy the constitutional requirement that it "purposefully
avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, ' 82 then the conspiracy component cannot confer jurisdiction.
The cases that hold otherwise" may be understood in one of three
ways. The court failed to heed the constitutional requirements, and its
erroneous conclusion was not corrected in any subsequent appeal (e.g.,
Wilcox). The extraterritorial actions of the non-resident defendant con-
spirators were sufficiently aimed or directed at actions taken within the
jurisdiction, and, as a result, at least colorable "purposeful availing" was
established (e.g., Textor).84 Finally, though perhaps a mere variation of
the preceding explanation:
while the mere presence of a conspirator within the forum state is not
sufficient to permit personal jurisdiction over co-conspirators, certain
additional connections between the conspiracy and the forum state
will support exercise of jurisdiction over co-conspirators .... These
additional connections exist where substantial acts in furtherance of
the conspiracy were performed in the forum state and the co-conspir-
ator knew or should have known that acts would be performed in the
forum state.85
IV. Is THAT ALL THERE IS?
In summary, the currently available uses of a claim of civil conspir-
acy are evidentiary, joint liability, and jurisdictional. The concept of
"civil conspiracy," however, should not be limited to these uses.
First, we should not readily accept the limitation that civil conspir-
acy must be tied to an underlying tort and cannot stand alone as a cause
of action for which recovery will lie. Second, for purposes of jury per-
suasion, the appeal of an image such as "civil conspiracy" is ideal
ammunition for certain cases. A jury, when skillfully shown the facts
that underlie the argument, will eagerly punish the conspirators and
make whole the injured parties.
A. Civil Conspiracy as a Stand-Alone Cause of Action
For 300 years it has been taken as settled law that there can be no
82. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
83. See Riback, supra note 80.
84. Where the constitutional standard is met, showing a conspiracy may aid in satisfying a
"laundry list" style state long-arm statute. For example, in Wilcox, the court found that conspiracy
allegations satisfied a state long-arm statute, thus enabling the court to obtain jurisdiction over an
absent party who commits any tortious act "through an agent," and finding that an in-state co-
conspirator is such an agent. Wilcox, 637 So. 2d at 337.
85. Gemini Enters., Inc. v. WFMY Telev. Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 565 (M.D.N.C. 1979)
(citations omitted).
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recovery based on a claim of civil conspiracy absent a completed, under-
lying tort. As a matter of pure logic, why should this be so? No sources
appear to doubt that this is the correct rule of law. For example:
"Whatever may be the rule in criminal conspiracies, it is well settled that
the civil liability does not depend upon the confederation (which need be
alleged only by way of inducement[86]), but upon the acts committed in
realization of the common purpose."87
There can be no question, we take it, but that an averment that
acts were done in pursuance of a conspiracy does not change the
nature of the civil action or add anything to its legal force and effect.
In a criminal prosecution for conspiracy the unlawful combination
and confederacy constitute the essential element of the offense rather
than the overt acts done in pursuance of it. But that doctrine does not
apply to civil suits for actionable torts.
The allegation of conspiracy in an action for tort which may be com-
mitted without a conspiracy, or plurality of tort-feasors, is mere mat-
ter of inducement and evidence, and, though a conspiracy be not
shown, recovery may be had against the defendant, or defendants,
participating in the tort. The gist of the action is not the conspiracy,
but the damage done to the plaintiff by the acts of the defendants.
The averment of the conspiracy does not change the form of action,
which is an action on the case.89
Authorities are numerous on the proposition that, in a civil case
of this nature, the abstract fraud and conspiracy are not the cause of
action, but rather the overt acts done in furtherance of the fraudulent
plan.
In 12 Corpus Juris, § 100, pp. 581, 582, we find the following
statement of the principle: "For obvious reasons, however, civil lia-
bility rests on different grounds, and unless something is actually
done by one or more of the conspirators pursuant to the scheme and
in furtherance of the object, which act results in damage, no civil
action lies against any one [sic]. The gist of the action is the damage
and not the conspiracy, and the damage must appear to have been the
natural and proximate consequence of the defendant's act."
Again, in section 104, pp. 584, 585: "As a general rule averment
and proof that the acts were done in pursuance of a conspiracy do not
change the nature of the action or add anything to its legal force and
86. An inducement, when used in this sense, refers to the "matter presented by way of
introduction or background to explain the principal allegations of a legal cause, plea, or defense."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1154 (1986).
87. Lewis Invisible Stitch Mach. Co. v. Columbia Blindstitch Mach. Mfg. Corp., 80 F.2d 862,
864 (2d Cir. 1936). See supra note 57 (commenting on Lewis).
88. Howland v. Corn, 232 F. 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1916) (quoting Green v. Davies, 75 N.E. 536
(N.Y. 1905)).
89. Barry v. Legler, 39 F.2d 297, 302 (8th Cir. 1930).
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effect." 9°
The difficulty with this kind of jurisprudence is that, notwithstand-
ing the easy assertion that the reasons for the rule are "obvious," one
searches in vain for an explicated statement of those reasons. The fol-
lowing review examines the cases relied on by the above citations.
1. NEW YORK CASES
A number of the cases cited above rely on Green v. Davies,91 a
ruling by the New York Court of Appeals. The case below had pro-
ceeded on a complaint that joined causes of action for slander and mali-
cious prosecution, to which the defendants demurred on the ground that
such causes of action could not properly be joined. The defendants took
an interlocutory appeal from the court's denial of the demurrer. The
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the defendants had correctly con-
tended improper joinder.92 There was more to the case than met the eye:
[Tihe learhed courts below [had conceded that the joinder was
improper], but their judgments proceeded on the theory that the
action was not for slander or malicious prosecution, but for conspir-
acy to injure the plaintiff, of which the slander and arrest were merely
the overt acts done in execution of the conspiracy. We are of [the]
opinion that this doctrine is opposed to the decisions in this state and
cannot be upheld. While it is true that in a criminal prosecution for
conspiracy the unlawful combination and confederacy are the gist of
the offense, not the overt acts done in pursuance thereof, which at
common law it was not necessary to set forth in the indictment,
though that rule has been changed by the statute law of this state, the
doctrine does not apply to civil suits for actionable torts. In Hutchins
v. Hutchins, 7 Hill. 104, it was said by Chief Justice Nelson, citing
authorities: "The writ of conspiracy, technically speaking, did not lie
at common law in any case, except where the conspiracy was to
indict the party either of treason or felony, by which his life was in
danger, and he had been acquitted of the indictment by verdict. All
the other cases of conspiracy in the books were but actions on the
case; and though it was usual to charge the conspiracy in the declara-
tion, the averment was immaterial, and need not be proved. The
action could always be brought against one defendant, or, if brought
against more, one might be found guilty, and the rest acquitted." The
question arose again in Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N.Y. 454, 20 N.E.
376, where Judge Andrews wrote: "The gravamen is fraud and dam-
age, and not the conspiracy .... The allegation and proof of a con-
spiracy in an action of this character is only important to connect a
90. United States v. Pan-American Petroleum Co., 55 F.2d 753, 778 (9th Cir. 1932).
91. 75 N.E. 536 (N.Y. 1905).
92. See id. at 537.
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defendant with the transaction and to charge him with the acts and
declarations of his co-conspirators, where otherwise he could not
have been implicated. But a mere conspiracy to commit a fraud is
never of itself a cause of action, and an allegation of conspiracy may
be wholly disregarded, and a recovery had, irrespective of such alle-
gation, in case the plaintiff is able otherwise to show the guilty partic-
ipation of the defendant. . . . Whenever it becomes necessary to
prove a conspiracy in order to connect the defendant with the fraud,
no averment of the conspiracy need be made in the pleadings to enti-
tle it to be proved. These principles are well settled. The opinion of
Chief Justice Nelson in Hutchins v. Hutchins, supra, contains an elab-
orate consideration of the subject, and no other authority need be
cited.93
Whether Green is a reliable guide to the soundness of the rule there
discussed depends on the background of the cases on which the court
relied. The Green court primarily relied on Hutchins v. Hutchins,94
which upon inspection does no more than adopt the rule stated in Savile
v. Roberts95 discussed infra Part IV.A.4, at least so far as the case con-
cerned whether there can be a separate, stand-alone action for civil con-
spiracy.96 Hutchins, therefore, sheds no new light on the issue, even
though the Green court appeared to agree with the Brackett court's view
that "[t]he opinion of Chief Justice Nelson in Hutchins v. Hutchins...
contains an elaborate consideration of the subject, and no other authority
need be cited." 97 Brackett v. Griswold,98 cited by the Green court, does
no more than incorporate the reasoning of Hutchins by reference.99
A third case relied on in Green, Keit v. Wyman,100 contains what
the Green court characterized as "a very clear opinion by Judge Follett,
who showed from the authorities that the gravamen of the action was not
the conspiracy, but the tort."'' However, Judge Follett's "authorities"
in Keit prove to be none other than, primarily, Savile v. Roberts,0 2 the
case relied on by the United States Supreme Court in Adler v. Fenton.11 3
His remaining citations yield no further elucidation of the rationale for
93. Id. (lack of paragraphing in original).
94. 7 Hill 104 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
95. 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 (1698); see discussion infra Part IV.A.4.
96. The other cases cited in Hutchins concerned another issue decided in the Savile case:
whether, despite a pleading of civil conspiracy, a verdict might stand against only one defendant
when the others were found not liable. That rule does not affect our analysis here.
97. Green v. Davies, 75 N.E. 536, 537 (N.Y. 1905).
98. 20 N.E. 376 (N.Y. 1889).
99. See id. at 379.
100. 22 N.Y.S. 133 (1893).
101. Green, 75 N.E. at 537.
102. 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 (1698).
103. 65 U.S. 407 (1860); see infra Part IV.A.3-4 (discussing Savile and Adler).
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the rule. "
2. MASSACHUSETTS CASES
Another line of cases frequently cited as authority for the "well-
established" rule concerning civil conspiracy is a collection of Massa-
chusetts case. These cases chiefly rely on Perry v. Hayes.'0 5 Perry con-
tains no analytical discussion of the rule, but instead simply cites to two
older Massachusetts cases, City of Boston v. Simmons °6 and Randall v.
Hazelton.'o7 Simmons arose from a demurrer sustained "on the ground
that the gist of the action was a conspiracy."108 In analyzing the com-
plaint, the Massachusetts Supreme Court adopted the usual statement of
the rule for civil conspiracy:
The averment of a conspiracy in the declaration does not ordina-
rily change the nature of the action, nor add to its legal force or
effect. The gist of the action is not the conspiracy alleged, but the
tort committed against the plaintiff, and the damage thereby done it
wrongfully .... [I0 9 ] On the other hand, when the tort committed and
the damage resulting therefrom proceed from a series of connected
acts, the averment that they were done by several in pursuance of a
conspiracy does not so change the nature of the action that, if the
wrongful acts are shown to have been done by one only, it cannot be
maintained against him alone, and the other defendants exonerated.
As it would be necessary in the case at bar, in order that both defend-
ants should be held responsible, to prove a combination and united
104. These cases include: Train v. Taylor, 4 N.Y.S. 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889); Verplanck v.
Van Buren, 76 N.Y. 247 (1879); Gardiner v. Pollard, 10 Bosw. 674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863); Forsyth
v. Edminston, 11 How. Pr. 408 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855); Cotterell v. Jones, 138 Eng. Rep. 655
(1851); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill. 104 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); Jones v. Baker, 7 Cow. 444 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1825).
The Forsyth case comes the closest to directly confronting the question - blandly answered
by the other courts - of why the rule should exist. In Forsyth, the court observes, "[A]ctions on
the case, in nature of a conspiracy ...are actions of tort, and are controlled by the general
principles which regulate all actions of tort brought to recover damages. The damage sustained by
the plaintiff is the ground of the action, and not the conspiracy." This language parrots the famous
language from Savile, considered infra Part IV.A.4. For 300 years courts have, in effect, accepted
the age-old rabbit-in-the-hat trick. See infra at p. 24.
105. 102 N.E. 318 (Mass. 1913); see Howland v. Corn, 232 F. 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1916) (citing
Perry); Lewis Invisible Stitch Mach. Co. v. Columbia Blindstitch Mach. Mfg. Corp., 80 F.2d 862,
864 (2d Cir. 1936) (same).
106. 23 N.E. 210 (Mass. 1890).
107. 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 412 (1866).
108. Simmons, 23 N.E. at 210.
109. As precedent for this rule, the court cited the following Massachusetts cases: Bowen v.
Matheson, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 499 (1867); Randall v. Hazelton, 94 Mass. 412 (1866); Hayward
v. Draper, 85 Mass. (85 Allen) 551 (1862); Parker v. Huntington, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 124 (1854);
Wellington v. Small, 57 Mass. (Cush.) 145 (1849). None of these cases sheds light on the
rationale for the rule.
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action on their part, the allegation of a conspiracy is a convenient and
proper mode of alleging such combination and action. For any other
purpose it is wholly immaterial.' 1 °
The other case cited in Perry is Randall v. Hazelton.' Randall
sheds no light on the reasons for the rule. It cites Parker v. Hunting-
ton12 and Hutchins, which merely parrot the rule from others of these
cases." 3 In summary, this collection of jurisprudence shows that the
cases feed on one another. Without exception, the cases trace back to
the rule announced in Savile." 4
3. THE GRANDDADDY OF CASES: ADLER V. FENTON
The seminal United States case that provides certainty to the rule of
law concerning the nature of civil conspiracy in American jurisprudence
is Adler v. Fenton.' 15 That case arose out of a commercial transaction
between defendants Adler and Schiff, who operated as traders in Mil-
waukee, and plaintiffs Fenton "and other merchants in New York." '16
Shortly after a large quantity of merchandise arrived in Milwaukee by
shipment from New York as a result of orders placed by Adler and
Schiff, Adler and Schiff allegedly assigned the merchandise "to one of
their co-defendants, for the ostensible purpose of paying their debts, but
really with the purpose of more effectually concealing it from the pursuit
of their creditors."'"' The plaintiff merchants averred that Adler and
Schiff
had combined and conspired with their codefendants in the court
below to dispose of their property fraudulently, so as to hinder and
defeat their creditors in the collection of their lawful demands, by
means of which fraudulent acts they affirm they suffered vexation
and expense, and finally incurred the loss of their debt.'" 8
The case came to the Supreme Court on assignment of error concerning,
inter alia, the trial court's charge to the jury
that the plaintiffs sold their goods to Adler & Schiff on credit; they
had no interest in the goods sold, or in the other property of these
defendants, but an interest in the debt owing for the goods so sold on
credit. And if the defendants have been guilty of a conspiracy to
110. Simmons, 23 N.E. at 211 (citations omitted).
111. 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 412 (1866).
112. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 124 (1854).
113. See supra Part IV.A.1-2 and infra Part IV.A.3 (describing these cases and their parroting
of the Savile rule).
114. See discussion infra Part IV.A.4.
115. 65 U.S. 407 (1860).
116. Id. at 408-09.
117. Id. at 409.
118. Id. at 408.
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remove the property of Adler & Schiff, and they did so remove their
property, with intent to defraud the plaintiffs in the collection of their
debt when it should become payable, even though it was not payable
when such removal was effected, the plaintiffs have a cause of action
after the debt became payable." 9
Finding this charge an incorrect statement of the law 1'° and there-
fore reversing the lower court's judgment, Justice Campbell wrote for a
unanimous Court:
To enable the plaintiffs to sustain an action on the case like the
present, it must be shown that the defendants have done some wrong,
that is, have violated some right of theirs, and that damage has
resulted as a direct and proximate consequence from the commission
of that wrong. The action cannot be sustained, because there has
been a conspiracy or combination to do injurious acts. In Savile v.
Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 374, Lord Holt said, "it was objected at the bar
against these old cases, that they were grounded upon a conspiracy,
which is of an odious nature and, therefore, sufficient ground for an
action by itself. But to this objection he answered, that conspiracy is
not the ground of these actions, but the damages done to the party; for
an action will not lie for the greatest conspiracy imaginable if nothing
be put in execution." There are cases of injurious acts for which a
suit will not lie unless there be fraud or malice concurring to charac-
terize and distinguish them. But in these cases the act must be tor-
tious, and there must be consequent damage. An act legal in itself,
and violating no right, cannot be made actionable on account of the
motive which superinduced it. It is the province of ethics to consider
of actions in their relation to motives, but jurisprudence deals with
actions in their relation to law, and for the most part independently of
the motive. 121
There it is. The Supreme Court spoke long ago, and with some
loquaciousness, on the subject. It even offered a rationale for the rule:
motives must be left to the ethicist, whereas it is for the law to deal only
with actions and resulting damages. Moreover, the Court quoted from
English jurisprudence, giving its reasoning an extra veneer of scholar-
ship and erudition. With such precedent, it is not surprising that Ameri-
119. Id. at 409-10.
120. The case turned specifically on the point that "a general creditor cannot bring an action on
the case against his debtor, or against those combining or colluding with him to make dispositions
of his property, although the object of those dispositions be to hinder, delay, and defraud
creditors." Id. at 413. The Supreme Court was apparently not blind to the injustice of the
situation, for it observed that such was the rule "[i]n the absence of special legislation." Id. The
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was drafted fifty-eight years, and first enacted fifty-nine
years, after Adler. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT References and Annotations, 7
U.L.A. 2 (1997) (Table of Jurisdictions).
121. Adler, 65 U.S. at 410.
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can courts have reiterated this rule as if it had come down with the
tablets from Sinai.
The difficulty with this precedent is that it is based on a case
decided in 1698, by justices living in a societal setting and time very
different from twentieth-soon to be twenty-first-century America. It
may be that the rule is a correct one, even transported in time by 300
years. In its broadest form, that view is questionable, given that motive
enters into a variety of civil causes of action today - discrimination
suits, for example. But there is a strong argument the rule is not correct.
Even if correct, it should be analyzed from a more modem viewpoint to
assure that the law is used to administer present-day justice, not justice
embalmed.
4. THE GREAT-GRANDDADDY OF CASES: SAVILE V. ROBERTS
Savile v. Roberts"' came to the King's Bench on a writ of error
from a judgment in Common Pleas, where the plaintiff, Savile, had
alleged that the defendant, Roberts, had twice falsely and maliciously
caused him to be indicted for "a riot."' 23 Savile had been acquitted on
both indictments.1 24 The jury found for plaintiff, and the defendant
moved for arrest of judgment on the ground that no action lay for the
recovery of the plaintiff's unnecessary expenses that arose from the false
indictments. 125 The court below held, and the Court at King's Bench
affirmed, that such an action did lie.
[T]his is the ground of the present action, for that the plaintiff was put
to unnecessary charges to answer the indictment; and it is most plain,
that he was put to unnecessary expenses, for that the jury have found
this prosecution was false and malicious. Now if there be an injury
done to a man's property, occasioned by a wicked and malicious
prosecution, it is all the reason in the world that a man should have an
action to repair himself.' 26
The above excerpt shows that the decision in Savile did not turn on
any question concerning the law of civil conspiracy. In short, the pur-
ported "rule" of Savile, quoted and relied on by the Supreme Court in
Adler, was dictum. The first clue to this comes at the outset of Savile,
122. 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 (1698). This English case is confusingly cited by differing versions of
its caption: e.g., Savile v. Roberts, Roberts v. Savill, Savill v. Roberts, Saville v. Roberts, and Savil
v. Roberts. It appears in the reports in eleven different locations and eleven different forms: 87
Eng. Rep. 725, 87 Eng. Rep. 733, 88 Eng. Rep. 1267, 90 Eng. Rep. 841, 90 Eng. Rep. 902, 90
Eng. Rep. 981, 90 Eng. Rep. 1005, 91 Eng. Rep. 664, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147, 92 Eng. Rep. 679, and
92 Eng. Rep. 886.
123. See Savile, 91 Eng. Rep. at 1149.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Roberts, 87 Eng. Rep. at 734.
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where the case in the trial court is summarized as being brought by
Savile against Roberts, a single defendant, with no named co-defendants
or co-conspirators 27 and no allegations of conspiracy. Chief Justice
Holt is actually forthright and candid in stating that his discussion of the
law generally, which leads to his discussion of civil conspiracy, is obiter
dictum, offered for the purpose of elucidating the area of law for the
benefit of future cases.
[F]or the better settling the matter, it may be fit to consider, upon
what grounds these actions are maintained; and I take it, that there
are three sorts of damages which will support all actions of this
nature.
First, where a man is injured in his fame or reputation, so that
his good name is lost; by reason of which injury, if the words them-
selves do not bear an action, the loss or damage that may ensue,
will....
The second relates to a man's person, where he is assaulted or
beaten, or put under any confinement whereby he is deprived of his
liberty ....
Now there is a third sort of damages which a man may sustain in
respect of his property; and this is the ground of the present action,
for that the plaintiff was put to unnecessary charges to answer this
indictment.... 28
Even here, when Chief Justice Holt concludes his outline of the
three types of action for malicious prosecution, there is no mention of
civil conspiracy. That subject is raised only when the opinion answers
an attempt by defendant/appellant Roberts to distinguish the cases the
Chief Justice relies on to support the third type of malicious prosecution
action.
It has been objected against these old cases, that these actions were
grounded upon a conspiracy, which is odious in the law, and that to
discourage such conspiracies to ruin men, such actions were allowed.
But I answer, that in those cases the conspiracy was not the ground of
the action, but the damage which the plaintiff sustained in respect of
the needless expenses he was put to; for no action lies for the bare
conspiracy, but it is the malicious prosecution which is the ground of
127. Of course, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to name or sue any of the alleged co-
conspirators in order to proceed on a theory of conspiracy. See, e.g., United States Fidelity and
Guar. Co. v. Maish, 908 P.2d 1329, 1338-39 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (applying estoppel principles
when an insurance company failed to bring a compulsory counterclaim of civil conspiracy against
an insured during the insured's prior action because, although at the time the insurance company
did not have the names of the co-conspirators, such was not necessary for a valid claim of civil
conspiracy). Nevertheless, the absence of mention of any involvement by anyone other than
Roberts indicates that a conspiracy was not involved.
128. Savile, 87 Eng. Rep. 733, 734 (initial emphasis added).
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the action, and when one only falsely and maliciously carries on the
prosecution, yet an action lies; and though it is called an action of
conspiracy, yet truly it is only an action on the case.'29
Thus, it appears that, if Chief Justice Holt had not deemed these
"conspiracy" cases worthy of being distinguished, the quotation from
Savile on which Adler relied never would have existed. To that extent,
as measured from the soundness of their cited precedents, Adler and its
American progeny should not be relied upon automatically as an intelli-
gent exposition of the law of civil conspiracy.
5. JUST BECAUSE YOU'RE PARANOID DOESN'T MEAN THEY'RE NOT
AFTER YOU
It is every brief-writer's nightmare to have a valued citation
exposed as dictum. Nevertheless, just because it's dictum doesn't mean
it's not the law. If the precedents for the dictum are sound, then the
dictum may arguably be taken as a convenient, even if not precedentially
binding, guide through a particular legal thicket. Accordingly, the
precedents Chief Justice Holt relied on in his frolic and detour concern-
ing civil conspiracy should be examined for soundness. Unfortunately,
he cited none. We are left, therefore, to analyze Holt's statement of the
law for its soundness of reasoning. Regardless of precedent, should this
rule be the rule of law?
6. IS THIS THE RIGHT RULE?
Initially, to assess the wisdom of the rule, we may look to the cases
that recite the rule to examine the rationale provided for the rule. As
reviewed above, virtually no rationale exists beyond what can be
gleaned from reading between the lines of Savile and the one glib obser-
vation in Adler.
Chief Justice Holt says in Savile that the cases brought under the
common-law form of civil conspiracy were actions on the case of which
a necessary element was damages, "for if there be never so great a con-
spiracy to indict a man, yet if nothing be done in pursuance of that con-
spiracy, the party can have no action."' 30 Here, Chief Justice Holt
engaged in one of the legal profession's oldest tricks, that of slipping the
rabbit into the hat just before pulling it out. If the action is labeled as
one in tort, then it requires proof of damages, but that conclusion follows
only because of the label chosen. If, instead, it is called an action for
conspiracy (without having to put it into a legal category such as con-
tract or tort), then arguably it is not restricted in the definition of its
129. Id. at 734-35 (footnotes omitted).
130. Savile v. Roberts, 88 Eng. Rep. 1267, 1268 (K.B. 1698).
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elements. This, indeed, was the case with the older form of action by
writ of conspiracy, wherein the older jurisprudence allowed recovery,
even if the conspiracy remained unexecuted.' 31
One must acknowledge that Chief Justice Holt's labeling exercise
was so effective that no one has questioned it since. Courts and com-
mentators have adopted it as sacrosanct. Bryan provides an apt example:
[T]he old form of action [by writ of conspiracy] embodied a funda-
mental error. This error lay in the idea that the element of combina-
tion among several persons to inflict harm upon another might in
itself furnish a universally valid foundation for a civil action for the
recovery of damages.
The fallacy involved in making a conspiracy the gist of a civil
action is manifest. The immediate purpose of such action is to reim-
burse the plaintiff for some material loss resulting from the infliction
upon him of a legal injury. The amount recoverable is the estimated
pecuniary measure of the loss, and in some cases an additional sum
by way of "punitive damages." In every instance, however, the plain-
tiff must have suffered actual damage from the very acts constituting
the legal wrong. Now obviously a bare agreement among two or
more persons to harm a third person inflicts no material hurt upon
him. However malevolent the combination may be, the person
against whom it is directed suffers no loss until the acts planned are
actually performed. Hence the acts done and not the conspiracy to do
them should be regarded as the gist of the proceeding to make good
the damage.132
This reasoning is entirely circular. Bryan buys Chief Justice Holt's
labeling and then uses the label to prove the correctness of the reason-
ing. The question not addressed is whether the choice of label and the
consequent design of the cause of action are sound.
The social and legal forces that led Chief Justice Holt to construct
his design of the cause of action for civil conspiracy as sounding in tort
are not addressed herein. The commentators seem to agree unanimously
that his design was more useful and more malleable to meet the then-
current needs than the older form of action.133 Merely because Chief
Justice Holt chose his label, however, does not mean that it should
remain applicable unless it continues to make sense. We must continue,
therefore, to probe the arguments regarding a cause of action for an
unexecuted civil conspiracy.
131. Bryan notes that "[diuring the reign of Richard II it was even said that one 'might have a
writ of conspiracy although they [the defendants] did nothing but the confederacy together, and
may recover damages' (Bellewe's Cases, Temp. Rich. II)." BRYAN, supra note 18, at 37 n.20.
132. Id. at 37-38 (footnote omitted).
133. See, e.g., BRYAN supra note 18, at 49; WINFELD, supra note 18, at 123.
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The only other stated rationale against a stand-alone action for civil
conspiracy is the Supreme Court's statement in Adler that the interrela-
tionship between actions and motives is left to the province of ethics,
whereas "jurisprudence deals with actions in their relation to law, and
for the most part independently of the motive."' 3 4 This rationale lacks
clear meaning. What, precisely, does the phrase "actions in their rela-
tion to law" mean? Why is it neatly hedged with the phrase "for the
most part?" Justice Campbell must have meant that the law does not
take cognizance of the evil that two persons might plan to do, only the
evil they actually do.
On analysis, that assertion does not stand up to scrutiny. The most
obvious exception to Justice Campbell's principle lies in the law of
criminal conspiracy. There, the law not only recognizes the evil that two
persons plan; it also prosecutes the evil nature of the plan.135 Given this
clear exception, which perhaps is the origin of Justice Campbell's hedge,
"for the most part," the only well-reasoned interpretation of Adler's the-
ory concerning civil conspiracy is that in civil cases, the law does not
take cognizance of the motive that might induce a harmful act, but only
of the act itself.
This observation leads to two related questions. First, is that state-
ment valid today in light of the development of the law since the time of
Adler? Second, even if we acknowledge that it is generally valid,
although somewhat eroded, should it control the question whether there
should be a stand-alone action for conspiracy?
The notion that the civil law does not take cognizance of motive
may be generally true, but it is riddled with exceptions. These excep-
tions were introduced by the development of causes of action unknown
or unaccepted at the time of Adler. For example, the Sherman Act eval-
uates the participants' intention to monopolize. Discrimination suits
allow proof of invidious motive. "In actions for interference with eco-
nomic relations it is generally recognized that the defendant's motive is
frequently a determining factor as to liability, and sometimes it is said
134. Adler, 65 U.S. at 410.
135. The validity and soundness of making criminal conspiracy itself a prosecutable criminal
offense without the underlying crime having been completed is controversial. See Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445, 446 & n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring) (criticizing the application
of conspiracy theory to certain situations, including those in which the underlying offense has not
been committed); JESSICA MITFORD, THE TRIAL OF DR. SPOCK 61 (1969) (calling the crime of
conspiracy a vaguely defined "poison"); see generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDINC
CRIMINAL LAW § 29.01(A) (2d ed. 1995) (explaining that a conspirator may be prosecuted for
conspiracy before committing the substantive offense); Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary
Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1973) (discussing the pitfalls of conspiracy
jurisprudence).
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that bad motive is the gist of the action." '136 Especially pertinent here are
the cases for "true conspiracy" that at least ten American jurisdictions
have allowed.137 In those jurisdictions, the motive itself makes the
wrong, rather than the underlying act that, by the stock definition of this
type of conspiracy, is a "lawful act, but one that is achieved by unlawful
means."
Given this relaxation of the supposed barrier to consideration of
motive, it cannot seriously be argued that motive must be excluded auto-
matically from playing a role in civil cases. Granting that the cases in
which motive may be considered are the exception rather than the rule,
what guidance can we seek to determine whether motive should come
into play? Once again, the statement of the rule and its supposed under-
lying principle merely beg the question: What should the rule be?
The answer to that question lies in analysis of the reasons that
would support a rule of law on either side of the issue. Let us pose the
question as follows: if one were to assert that the rule in civil cases
should be the same as in criminal cases - that there should be a cogniza-
ble action for a conspiracy standing alone, without a completed tort or
damages resulting - what policy reasons are there to support such a rule,
and what detriments argue against it?
a. Reasons That Support The Rule
For guidance on this issue, we may examine the criminal law to see
what rationales underlie a prosecution for mere conspiracy without a
completed crime. Will such rationales apply with equal force to the civil
setting?
Why are conspiracies punished? Two answers are frequently sup-
plied. According to Professor Joshua Dressler:
As with other inchoate offenses, the bar on conspiratorial agree-
ments provides police officers with a basis for arresting people before
they commit other criminal offenses.
Conspiracy law allows police intervention at a much earlier
point than is permitted under attempt law .... [A] common law con-
spiracy is formed the moment two or more persons agree that one of
them will later commit an unlawful act. At common law, no conduct
in furtherance of the conspiracy is required; even when an act in fur-
therance of the conspiracy is statutorily required, the act may be
wholly preparatory to the commission of the target offense. Conse-
quently, advocates of conspiracy laws believe that the offense unfet-
136. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 5, at 28 (5th
ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
137. See discussion supra at pp. 9-11 and accompanying notes.
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ters police and fills in the gaps in the "unrealistic" law of criminal
attempts. They also justify conspiracy law on the ground that an
agreement to commit a criminal act is concrete and unambiguous evi-
dence of the actors' dangerousness and the firmness of their criminal
intentions.
According to advocates of conspiracy laws, two people united to
commit a crime are more dangerous than one or both of them sepa-
rately planning to commit the same offense: "the strength, opportuni-
ties and resources of many is obviously more dangerous and more
difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer."'' 38
The purported dangers inherent in collective criminal action are
many. First, as a result of fear of co-conspirators, loyalty to them, or
enhanced morale arising from the collective effort, a party to a con-
spiracy is less likely to abandon her criminal plans than if she were
acting alone. Other special dangers are said to inhere in conspiracies.
Collectivism promotes efficiency through division of labor; group
criminality makes the attainment of more elaborate crimes possible;
and the "[c]ombination in crime makes more likely the commission
of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the group was
formed." 139
Each of these rationales supports the use of an action for civil con-
spiracy standing alone. First, the cause of action can be used as a means
of prevention. One may argue that it is necessary to prevent the com-
mission of certain civil wrongs by making their very plotting actionable.
To paraphrase a section from the passage above: "As with other incho-
ate offenses, the bar on conspiratorial agreements provides plaintiffs
with a basis for suing people before they commit other tortious
offenses." This argument assumes, of course, that the conspirator
intends to commit a wrong that society considers outrageous and needful
of prevention. This should be limited in much the same way as the rule
of criminal law. For example, criminal law should not be intended to
promote prosecutions for conspiracy to, say, shoplift. 4 °
Secondly, a stand-alone action for civil conspiracy can be used to
combat "dangers inherent in collective tortious action." Each of the
underlying factors listed above may be adapted to a tort setting. Two
138. DRESSLER, supra note 135, § 29.02(A), at 394-95 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Krulewitch
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
139. DRESSLER, supra note 135, §29.02(A), at 395 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Callanan v.
United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961)).
140. This is not to deny that conspiracy has been prosecuted for trivial offenses. See, e.g.,
Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 449 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[The conspiracy concept] also may
be trivialized, as here, where the conspiracy consists of the concert of a loathsome panderer and a
prostitute to go from New York to Florida to ply their trade ... and it would appear that a simple
Mann Act prosecution would vindicate the majesty of federal law.") (citation omitted).
[Vol. 54:1
CIVIL CONSPIRACY
people united to commit a tort are more dangerous than one or both of
them separately planning to commit the same offense. "The strength,
opportunities and resources of many is obviously more dangerous and
more difficult to monitor than the efforts of a lone tortfeasor." As a
result of fear of co-conspirators, loyalty to them, or enhanced morale
arising from the collective effort, a party to a conspiracy is less likely to
abandon her tortious plans than if she were acting alone.
Against this argued congruence between the rationales for the crim-
inal rule and a similar civil rule, one might object that society generally
takes crime more seriously than civil wrongs. The truth of this conten-
tion depends on how heinous the crime is and how outrageous the civil
wrong is. If it should be proved that the tobacco companies had con-
sciously, intentionally, maliciously, and with full awareness of the con-
sequences acted in concert to develop the cigarette to its highest level of
addictiveness, when that development brought with it a consequential
increase in the deadly nature of the addiction, would it seriously be con-
tended that civil law should not reach such conduct, at least in terms of
the gravity of the offense to societal interests?' 4 1 One might acknowl-
edge that the evil targeted should rise to a very high level of societal
toxicity before it should support an independent cause of action for civil
conspiracy. But to argue that no civil wrong can rise to such a high level
- which is the logical underpinning of an argument that there should be
no such independent cause of action - is an indefensible prejudgment.
The question should await the case presented, as in all common-law
jurisprudence.' 42
b. Detriments of the Rule
There are four likely objections to the necessity and workability of
the rule. First, opponents will suggest that many of the criticisms 1ev-
141. I recognize the argument that plaintiffs who could demonstrate actual injury from the
conspiracy may constitute a sufficient body of "private attorneys general" to vindicate society's
interest in the prevention of such conspiratorial tortious activity. That argument is addressed
below in discussion of the question of who may be the plaintiffs in an inchoate conspiracy action,
i.e., one brought for the conspiracy alone before the tort and the resulting damage have happened.
142. On this point one may note that when Chief Justice Holt issued his obiter dictum
pronouncement on the non-actionability of civil conspiracy as an independent cause of action, he
particularly noted the exception provided for by the writ of conspiracy, which targeted
conspiracies that rose to a high level of social toxicity:
For conspiracy (to speak properly) lies only for procuring a man to be indicted of
treason or felony, where life was in danger .... But in an action for a conspiracy no
villainous judgment shall be given, unless the life was endangered by that
conspiracy; and therefore where it is brought for a trespass, it is only an action upon
the case.
Savile v. Roberts, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1150 (K.B. 1698).
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eled at the crime of conspiracy 14 3 apply equally, or at least with substan-
tial pertinence, to the expansion of the concept of civil conspiracy.
Second, opponents will argue that the new rule is an unnecessary expan-
sion of the law of torts at a time when society is inclined to trim back the
boundaries of tort law. Third, opponents will object that the rule is
unworkable because there are either no plaintiffs or too many plaintiffs.
Fourth, opponents will argue that the proposed rule is toothless because
without compensable harm there is no outcome (aside from the expense
and inconvenience of mounting a defense) that would serve as an appro-
priate preventive sanction against the conspiring defendants' conduct.
i. Applicable Criticisms from the Criminal Law.
To generalize from the most quoted sources that have criticized the
use of conspiracy doctrine in the criminal law,' 44 the flaw of vagueness,
or "overbreadth," seems the critics' preeminent concern." 5 Consider
the following:
The modem crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies
definition. Despite certain elementary and essential elements, it also,
chameleon-like, takes on a special coloration from each of the many
independent offenses on which it may be overlaid.
[E]ven when appropriately invoked, the looseness and pliability
of the doctrine present inherent dangers which should be in the back-
ground of judicial thought wherever it is sought to extend the doc-
trine to meet the exigencies of a particular case. 146
"In the long category of crimes there is none, not excepting crimi-
nal attempt, more difficult to confine within the boundaries of definitive
statement than conspiracy."'' 47
"A doctrine so vague in its outlines and uncertain in its fundamen-
tal nature as criminal conspiracy lends no strength or glory to the law; it
is a veritable quicksand of shifting opinion and ill-considered
thought."' 48
Addressing these criticisms is somewhat problematic, in that the
143. See supra note 135.
144. To the sources cited at supra note 135, add: Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35
HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922); Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624
(1941).
145. Throughout this section of the article, I have omitted consideration of the flaws that
concern only the workings of the criminal law. The point addressed here is the extent to which
criticisms on the criminal side should be considered when the expansion of the civil side is
contemplated.
146. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
147. Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624 (1941).
148. Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1923).
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critics' explanations of the nature of the "vagueness" are themselves
vague. In Krulewitch, Justice Jackson contented himself with a citation
to the above often-quoted passage from Harno's article; a reference to an
English author's pessimistic conclusion that "no intelligible definition of
'conspiracy' has yet been established";' 49 and the following illustrative
definitions of the term that he presents to show their inadequacy:
Justice Holmes supplied an oversimplified working definition in
United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601... : "A conspiracy is a partner-
ship in criminal purposes." This was recently restated "A conspiracy
is a partnership in crime." Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640.
Carson offers the following resume of American cases: "It
would appear that a conspiracy must be a combination of two or more
persons by some concerted action to accomplish some criminal
object; or some object not criminal by criminal means; or, some
object not criminal by means which are not criminal, but where mis-
chief to the public is involved; or, where neither the object nor the
means are criminal, or even unlawful, but where injury and oppres-
sion to individuals are the result." The Law of Criminal Conspira-
cies, as found in American Cases, p. 123.150
To be sure, if the objection of vagueness is based on such defini-
tions as those quoted above, the objection is not hard to understand; such
definitions are, to put it bluntly, useless. Such an objection, however,
does not pertain to the definition of civil conspiracy used in this article's
analysis and as the basis for the suggested expansion of the concept.
This definition ("An agreement - together with an overt act - to do an
unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner"), has a recognizable
meaning far more understandable than the definitions Jackson quoted,
especially when it is particularized by the clarification that a recognized
tort must be the object of the conspiracy.
Rather than their quarrel being simply with the looseness of the
definition, it is more likely the critics are concerned that the charge of
criminal conspiracy could be levied against the conspirators even where
the objectives of the conspiracy were not criminal themselves. 51 This
objection does not pertain to the suggested expansive use of civil con-
spiracy, which would apply only to recognized torts as the object of the
conspiracy.
149. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446, n.3 (1949) (quoting R.S. WRIGHT, THE
LAW OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES (1873)).
150. Id., at 447 n.4.
151. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1986) §6.4(b),
at 527 ("Undoubtedly the main reason for this criticism [of vagueness] is the fact that the law of
conspiracy developed in such a way that certain objectives not in themselves criminal will
suffice").
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Another basis for the critics' objection to vagueness is the intangi-
ble aspect of the factors of agreement and intent. Immediately after his
reference to the "chameleon-like" quality of the concept, Justice Jack-
son, quoting Harno, observed that conspiracy "is always 'predominantly
mental in composition' because it consists primarily of a meeting of
minds and an intent."' 152 LaFave and Scott note that "the vagueness
stems from other aspects of the crime as well, including the uncertainty
over what is sufficient to constitute the agreement and what attendant
mental state must be shown."' 53 The implication of this complaint is
that, without clearer specification of the concreteness required of the
agreement or the intent, alleged conspirators will be defending against
charges so ill-defined that they will be unable to formulate their
defenses. "These ambiguities compound the difficulties of defending
against a conspiracy charge, for 'it is hard to find an antidote for the
poison you cannot identify.'" 54
As applied to civil cases, this criticism of vagueness demonstrates
an underestimation of the ability of judges to require specificity in the
underlying pleading, discovery, and dispositive motions of cases
brought before them. Defendants can test the adequacy of the plaintiff's
pleadings by motions to dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings, or for a
more definite statement.15 5 It is true that under federal and similar state-
court notice pleading there will likely be few cases disposed of at the
pleading stage, but the early testing process serves to sensitize the judge
to possible weaknesses in a plaintiffs ability to prove her theories of
agreement and intent. Such early sensitivity to the possibility of a "fish-
ing expedition" will guide the judge's later consideration of dispositive
motions.
Assuming the sufficiency of the pleadings,' 56 if discovery discloses
that proofs are lacking, summary judgment or judgment as a matter of
law 5 7 may dispose of the case. In all such settings, the court will exer-
cise its judgment in deciding whether there is a sufficient showing of
agreement and intent to warrant further entertainment of the case.
Finally, if the plaintiff survives all of these hurdles, she still must per-
152. Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 447-48.
153. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 151, at 527 (footnote omitted).
154. Id. (quoting J. MITFORD, THE TRIAL OF DR. SPOCK 61 (1969)).
155. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c), & (e).
156. Plaintiffs will have a persuasive argument that little specificity should be demanded at the
pleading stage, given that the agreements that underlie conspiracies are so often unspoken and can
only be discovered and demonstrated through investigation. A more radical approach to
answering this criticism would be to require more specificity at the pleading stage, by expanding
the coverage of rules such as FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring particularity when pleading fraud or
mistake).
157. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50, 56.
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suade the jury. A case that does not merit the sanction of exemplary
damages will be turned away by the jury's sound instincts for what is
important and what is not.
The critics' point may not be the lack of safeguards against non-
meritorious cases, but the lack of a standard against which to measure
the proofs of agreement and intent. But how does this criticism distin-
guish the proposed cause of action for civil conspiracy from other mat-
ters in which intent is an issue?' 58 Inevitably, one must rely on the good
judgment and common sense of judges and juries to weed out the good
cases from the bad. If this is not so, the answer to the criticism
addressed here is not to forbid actions for civil conspiracy but to replace
our system of trial by judge or jury.
Analysis of the evidence offered at trial in a case such as Halber-
stam v. Welch' 59 demonstrates that our judge and jury safeguards are
sufficient to protect defendants from the fear of vagueness on the issues
of agreement and intent. Halberstam involved a murder prosecution of a
cat-burglar, Bernard Welch, and his common-law wife, Linda Hamilton,
arising out of the shooting of a prominent Washington, D.C. physician
when he surprised the burglar in the physician's home. 6 ' The issue was
the sufficiency of the evidence to show agreement and intent on the part
of Ms. Hamilton that would expose her to liability for the wrongful
death. '61
The Halberstam opinion shows how clear the proofs of agreement
and intent can be, even when based on circumstantial evidence. 1
62
[Clourts have to infer an agreement from indirect evidence in most
civil conspiracy cases. The circumstances of the wrongdoing gener-
158. See discussion supra pp. 26-27.
159. 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). This case is discussed in greater detail infra in the section
concerning jury persuasion.
160. See id. at 474-76.
161. See id. at 476.
162. It may appear that we have turned the principle of a fortiori on its head by arguing that a
strong case shows how adequate the safeguards are. The concern is, of course, that weak cases
will slip past the judge and dupe the jury into a plaintiff's verdict where the proofs are much less
convincing than in Halberstam. The point is that the strength of the proofs in a case like
Halberstam shows what the courts are looking for and will be used as a guide against which to
measure other cases as they are tested in pre-trial and mid-trial motions challenging the
sufficiency of the proofs and, similarly, when they are tested on appeal.
To analyze this issue from the other end of the telescope, one may look at a case where the
proofs offered of agreement and intent were demonstrably insufficient. See discussion of Wolf v.
Liberis, 505 N.E.2d 1202 (I11. App. Ct. 1987), infra in the section concerning jury persuasion.
There, the court demonstrated its ability to distinguish a bad case from a good case by dismissing
the conspiracy count.
If this suggested reliance on the wisdom of our judges and juries does not satisfy the critics,
then as an alternative we might require that agreement and intent be proved by clear and
convincing evidence in civil conspiracy cases.
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ally dictate what evidence is relevant or available in deciding whether
an agreement exists. Factors like the relationship between the par-
ties' acts, the time and place of their execution, and the duration of
the joint activity influence the determination. In this case, Hamilton
and Welch did not commit burglaries together but their activities
were symbiotic. They were pursuing the same object by different but
related means. Their home became the storage and processing base
for Welch's criminal activities; they thus performed some of their
different parts of the illegal operation together at the same location.
The long-running nature of the scheme is also crucial to the inference
of agreement - Hamilton's knowledge and aid over five years makes
some kind of accord extremely likely - perhaps only a tacit accord,
but that is enough. Furthermore, while Hamilton's extensive partici-
pation in the profits of the illegal venture might not by itself prove an
agreement, her unquestioning accession of wealth during this period
is certainly consistent with such an agreement. Totaling all this evi-
dence up, the district court's conclusion that Hamilton and Welch
reached an understanding about their illegal enterprise withstands
attack. 163
Moreover, the soundness of the Court of Appeals' reasoning on this
point is buttressed by the specific findings by the trial court:
[Hamilton] knew full well the purpose of [Welch's] evening
forays and the means by which she and Welch had risen from "rags
to riches" in a relatively short period of time. She closed neither her
eyes nor her pocketbook to the reality of the life she and Welch were
living. She was compliant, but neither dumb nor duped, so long as
her personal comfort and fortune were assured. She was a willing
partner in his criminal activities. 164
Perhaps most convincingly from a trial lawyer's perspective, "[t]he
district court based this conclusion largely on Hamilton's own testi-
mony."' 165 The fact-finder's opportunity to see and hear the defendant's
testimony as to whether she did or did not participate in any agreement
and whether she could be found to have had the required level of intent
rests squarely on the Anglo-American tradition that places ultimate trust
in the aptitude of the adversarial system to flush out the adequacy or
inadequacy of proofs. As noted above, if one cannot trust that safe-
guard, then one must turn to a new system of dispute resolution. The
commentators (and even appellate courts) that express concern about
''vagueness" fail to account adequately for the revealing nature of the
trial confrontation among witnesses, advocates, and fact-finders.
163. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
164. Id. at 474 (quoting Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, Mem. Op. at 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 24,
1982)).
165. Id. at 474.
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This answer runs counter to a prevalent opinion that judges and
juries do not keep frivolous or meritless cases at bay. The news is full of
reports of causes of action and verdicts that sound preposterous.
66
However, my experience as a trial lawyer, my conversations with col-
leagues about their experiences, and my observations of student trials in
law school that are presided over by judges and decided by volunteer
jurors from the community, all lead me to respectfully disagree with the
doubters.
Finally, on this first leg of the criticisms of criminal conspiracy that
may also apply to civil conspiracy, we may expect to hear the concern of
the "burden on the courts." If one doubted whether the remedy of a
166. The Krulewitch case may be cited - as Justice Jackson argued and intended - as a leading
example of the kind of miscarriage of justice that an overly-vague use of conspiracy doctrine can
produce. There, a post-conspiracy statement was admitted as a co-conspirator hearsay exception
to buttress the proofs of agreement and intent.
The challenged testimony was elicited by the Government from its complaining witness, the
person whom petitioner and the woman defendant allegedly induced to go from New York to
Florida for the purpose of prostitution. The testimony narrated the following purported
conversation between the complaining witness and petitioner's alleged co-conspirator, the woman
defendant.
She asked me, she says, "You didn't talk yet?" And I says, "No." And she says,
"Well, don't," she says, "until we get you a lawyer." And then she says, "Be very
careful what you say." And I can't put it in exact words. But she said, "It would be
better for us two girls to take the blame than Kay (the defendant) because he
couldn't stand it, he couldn't stand to take it."
Krulewich v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 441 (1949). This conversation took place more than a
month and a half after the completion of the allegedly conspired Mann Act trip to Florida. See id.
at 442. Given how hard the parties fought to admit or exclude this hearsay, which was the issue
that brought the case to the Supreme Court, it is likely the rest of the Government's case was
feeble. Indeed, this was the inference drawn by the majority, which reversed on the ground of the
erroneous admission of this evidence and concluded:
[E]rror should not be held harmless under the harmless error statute if upon consid-
eration of the record the court is left in grave doubt as to whether the error had
substantial influence in bringing about the verdict. We have such doubt here. The
Florida District Court grand jury failed to indict. After indictment in New York
petitioner was tried four times with the following results: mistrial; conviction; mis-
trial; conviction with recommendation for leniency. The revolting type of charges
made against this petitioner by the complaining witness makes it difficult to believe
that a jury convinced of a strong case against him would have recommended leni-
ency. There was corroborative evidence of the complaining witness on certain
phases of the case. But as to all vital phases, those involving the sordid criminal
features, the jury was compelled to choose between believing the petitioner or the
complaining witness. The record persuades us that the jury's task was difficult at
best. We cannot say that the erroneous admission of the hearsay declaration may
not have been the weight that tipped the scales against petitioner.
Id. at 444-45.
Such a foolish case as Krulewitch might be argued as a sound basis for drawing the narrowest
possible limits around the use of conspiracy doctrine. Given the relief the defendant finally
obtained in the Supreme Court, the case may be used equally to support the argument that one
may rely on judges and juries adequately to protect against misuse of the doctrine.
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stand-alone action for civil conspiracy is truly needed, the burden on the
courts should be taken into consideration in weighing the social utility of
the amendment to the law. However, if the need for the remedy is seen
as strong and persuasive, as it should be for the kind of anti-social
behavior posited by the two hypothetical conspiracies discussed herein,
then the issue of the burden on the courts should be, not an argument
against expansion of the law, but rather a challenge to the ingenuity of
the courts and budgeters to respond to new needs with new remedies. 67
ii. Too Great an Expansion of Tort Law?
It is not the purpose of this article to join the debate whether tort
law needs to be reformed, constricted, expanded, or locked in status quo.
The point here is that, as reviewed above, there is no binding precedent -
unless one wishes to honor 300 years of dictum-based jurisprudence - to
constrain those who would expand the reach of tort law to target unexe-
cuted civil conspiracies. Whether the law should be so expanded
depends on the seriousness of the conspiracy that may be uncovered;
until it is uncovered, it is too early to say. The tools are available, so the
path is clear for the courts or legislatures to expand the law if the need
is found to arise. 168
167. Beyond the objection to vagueness, there are three further criticisms directed at the law of
criminal conspiracy that arguably would apply to civil conspiracy. First, some commentators
express concern that standard venue provisions can work an unfair hardship on defendants in a
conspiracy action because the acts by one conspirator may give rise to venue in a location where
another of the conspirators had no connection. As a result, one conspirator will be "compel[led]
. . . to defend at a great distance from any place he ever did any act because some accused
confederate did some trivial and by itself innocent act in the chosen district." Krulewitch, 336
U.S. at 453; see also Johnson, supra note 135, at 1175-80. This objection could be resolved by
adding a special venue provision to a civil conspiracy statute. Such a provision could mimic the
suggestion voiced in the criminal-law arena of siting venue where the agreement was made.
Second, commentators are concerned that the statute of limitations that is applicable to
conspiracy cases may subject defendants to an unreasonably long period of vulnerability to suit
because the statute ordinarily does not begin to run until the conspiracy is either abandoned or
successfully completed. See Johnson, supra note 135, at 1180. This objection could be answered
by requiring the statute of limitations on suits for civil conspiracy to begin to run on the formation
of the agreement or from the date on which the existence of the conspiracy could have been
discovered through reasonable diligence.
Third, it is objected that the co-conspirator exemption from the hearsay rule is too often
abused by having the co-conspirators' admissions used as the basis for the finding of the
underlying agreement - a classic "bootstrap." Id. at 1185. Of course, to the extent this concern
stemmed from the possibility that the contested statements alone could provide the required
foundation, a question left open in Bourjaily, the 1998 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E) answered this concern by specifying that such admissions could be considered but
were not alone sufficient to establish "the existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein
of the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered .... If that amendment does
not fully meet the objection, then the rule could be further amended to rule out consideration of
the contested statements until the underlying foundation is proved by other, independent evidence.
168. The availability of other remedies, such as injunctive relief or suits under RICO, may
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iii. Too Many or Too Few Plaintiffs?
The objectors to the proposed rule will raise the question of who
can sue. If no one has suffered compensable harm, who will have stand-
ing? This would be a problem under the federal standing requirement of
"injury-in-fact," given our hypothetical of an unexecuted conspiracy. 16 9
If there is no one who can have standing, the rule will languish in this
law review article. In the antique terms of civil docket management, it
will be non prossed.
At the other end of the spectrum, to award standing to anyone
targeted by the conspiracy may introduce too many plaintiffs. In the
example of the tobacco companies' conspiracy, anyone who has seen or
heard an advertisement for cigarettes could argue for the right to sue
because he has been made a target of the conspiracy.
There are several answers to these standing problems. As to the
requirement of "injury-in-fact," it may be that this proposed expansion
of the law must take place in state courts where the requirements for
standing need not be injury-based.17 If new legislative enactments
accomplish this expansion, the drafters could provide the more accom-
modating type of standing that is found in such statutes as the Fair Hous-
strengthen the objection that this expansion of the use of civil conspiracy is unwarranted.
However, an injunction effectively would deter only the conspirators themselves, whereas the
underlying rationale for expanding the use of civil conspiracy includes deterring not only the
specific conspiracy, but also other similar conspiracies. It is meant to be a tool to enable private
or states' attorneys general to take action to prevent pernicious forms of anti-social behavior. In
that respect, an injunction against specific conspirators would fail to meet the broader purpose. As
to RICO, its use is limited to conduct that affects interstate commerce and economic interests by
damaging a business. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962 (1984). Those restrictions would render it
inapplicable to many types of civil conspiracy that the suggested stand-alone action could reach.
169. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53
(1970) (establishing the two-part standing test which requires that: (1) a plaintiff allege a cause of
action based on an "injury in fact"; and (2) the interest the plaintiff seeks to protect come within
the "zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question").
170. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated explicitly that "standing" is a requirement imposed on
federal courts based on the "Cases" and "Controversies" language of Article III, section 2 of the
United States Constitution. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968). Hence, states may construe
the standing requirements imposed by their own constitutions as not requiring the same inquiry
regarding "injury-in-fact." For example, the Alaska Supreme Court has noted that "[tihe Alaska
Constitution does not explicitly limit court jurisdiction to 'cases' and 'controversies'...." Moore
v. Alaska, 553 P.2d 8, 23 (Alaska 1976). The Moore court further observed that, because "the
requirement of adversity [in the "injury-in-fact" analysis under standing doctrine] has no
constitutional base in Alaska, our requirement that it exist must be characterized as a judicial rule
of self-restraint-as must the entire doctrine of standing itself." Id. Although the Moore court
ultimately decided to continue to promote an "adversity" requirement in the standing analysis in
order to "ensure that a question presented for [the court's] review is one that is appropriate for
judicial determination," id., the point remains that at least one court has recognized the possibility
of a less injury-based claim under state law.
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ing Act.' 71
As to the problem of too many plaintiffs, the use of class actions
may be appropriate to many cases. Alternatively, a statutory enactment
can give standing to the whistle-blower who pursues, uncovers, and
prosecutes an action against the conspirators. As a third alternative, one
could award standing to states' attorneys general to prosecute civil con-
spiracies on behalf of the states' citizenry, as in environmental enforce-
ment actions.
Further, the standing problems revealed by the hypothetical
"macro-conspiracy" concerning the tobacco companies would not
appear to exist in the "micro-conspiracy" hypothesized concerning the
cat-burglar ring targeting private homes. One might imagine a situation
based on the facts of Halberstam, except that the cat burglar is caught
before he puts his plans into action against his targets' residence. His
plans disclose that he has surveilled the family's activities for months;
he has shadowed their movements as they walk their pets and travel to
work, school, and weekend trips to their country house; he has obtained
engineering specifications for their home alarm system by clever thiev-
ery via the Internet; and he has self-defense plans in place, including
arming himself with a .357 Magnum. When the intended victims learn
of these plans, have not the invasion of their privacy (albeit unknown to
them at the time it was ongoing) and the foreboding threat to their safety
changed them forever? Should they have no recompense beyond the
"satisfaction" of seeing the burglar convicted of criminal conspiracy or
attempted burglary? Should that arguable satisfaction continue when
their predator is released on parole after four months of incarceration?
Do the targeted victims of these facts lack standing? 72
171. Because, within the limits of constitutional requirements, standing turns on prudential
judicial limitations on federal court jurisdiction, Congress has been able to loosen the standing
doctrine in some instances. Section 812 of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 expands standing to the
limits of Article III of the United States Constitution. As a result, merely "prudential"
determinations of standing analysis are not applicable to these causes of action. See Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 98, 108 (1979); accord Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972) (reaching some conclusion regarding section 810 of the
Fair Housing Act of 1968 with respect to tenants alleging unlawful discrimination). Indeed, in
Gladstone, the Court recited the rule that pure Article III analysis requires only that a plaintiff
show "some actual or threatened injury as a result [of the defendant's conduct]." 441 U.S. at 99.
172. In the majority of American jurisdictions, a cause of action for invasion of privacy may be
available on these hypothetical facts. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,
490 (Cal. 1998) (confirming that California recognizes the tort of intrusion, the elements of which
are: (1) "intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter"; and (2) that such intrusion is done
"in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person"). Nevertheless, the remedy of a preventive
action for unexecuted civil conspiracy is arguably needed in jurisdictions that interpret narrowly
the kinds of intrusion that are actionable. For example, in the hypothetical there was no
"snooping" or peering into the intended victims' residential premises. The defendants might
argue successfully against an invasion of privacy claim on the grounds that "[o]n the public street,
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iv. Too Toothless?
In answer to the objection that a minatory cause of action for unex-
ecuted civil conspiracy will be ineffective because there will be no dam-
ages to sanction the type of conduct the conspirators were plotting, the
availability of exemplary damages would provide the necessary threat.
After all, exemplary damages are deemed appropriate for exactly that
purpose. Beyond simply punishing the direct defendant, they are also
intended to deter others from similar conduct in the future.
173
This solution only raises the next difficulty, namely, the majority
rule that exemplary damages are allowed only where there is an award
of compensatory damages.' 74 One solution to this problem would be to
allow an award of nominal damages for the claim of conspiracy, thus
authorizing an additional award of exemplary damage. Some courts,
however, have held that exemplary damages may not be obtained when
only nominal damages are awarded. 75 In opposition to such decisions,
Prosser asserts that because
it is precisely in the cases of nominal damages that the policy of
providing an incentive for plaintiffs to bring petty outrages into court
comes into play, the view very much to be preferred appears to be
that of the minority which have held that there is sufficient support
for punitive damages. 17
6
Moreover, Prosser notes that some courts have even allowed exemplary
damages in cases in which the jury awards no other damages.1 77
In many instances, this approach would put the "reasonable rela-
tion" issue to a test 178 because the defendants would assert that in rela-
tion to nominal damages any exemplary damages would have to be
or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no legal right to be alone; and it is no invasion of his
privacy to do no more than follow him about and watch him there." KEETON ET AL., supra note
10, § 117, at 855.
173. Stevens v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 533 (Ct. App. 1996)
("The purpose of punitive damages is a public one-to punish wrongdoing and deter future
misconduct by either the defendant or other potential wrongdoers."); see Leidholt v. District Ct.
619 P.2d 768, 770 (Colo. 1980) (observing that Colorado law utilizes exemplary damages to
punish wrongdoers and deter others from engaging in similar conduct); Walker v. Sheldon, 179
N.E.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. 1961) (explaining that exemplary damages are awarded to punish the
defendant, to deter the defendant from committing the act again, and to deter others from doing
the same); JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 14.05(A), at 239 (1996) (listing
the dual objectives of exemplary damages: punishment and prevention).
174. See, e.g., Building Structures, Inc. v. Young, 968 P.2d 1287 (Or. 1998); Jemison v.
National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc., 720 A.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Schlegel v. Ottumwa
Courier, 585 N.W.2d 217 (Iowa 1998); Durham v. Mooney, 507 S.E.2d 877 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998);
see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 2, at 14.
175. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 2, at 14 n.71.
176. Id. § 2, at 14 (emphasis added).
177. See id. § 2, at 14 n.72.
178. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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minimal. The "reasonable relation" factor, however, is only one factor
to be considered in determining whether punitives have been assessed
properly and constitutionally, and it is not the predominant factor.' 79
"Perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a puni-
tive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct. As the [Supreme] Court stated nearly 150 years ago, exem-
plary damages imposed on a defendant should reflect 'the enormity of
his offense.' "'o Further, and particularly applicable to the hypotheticals
posed in this article, low awards of compensatory damages may properly
support a higher ratio of damages than high compensatory awards, if, for
example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount
of economic damages. Cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the
monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to deter-
mine may justify a higher ratio.' 8'
Alternatively or in addition, the law could allow as recoverable
compensatory damages the expenses incurred by plaintiffs in exposing
and resisting the wrongful activities of the defendants. British law has
allowed such recovery in civil conspiracy cases:
[T]he plaintiffs maintain, and must maintain, a large investigation
department, and the money actually expended in unravelling and
detecting the unlawful machinations of the defendants which have
been proved in this case before any proceedings could be taken must
have been considerable. I can see no reason for not treating the
expenses so incurred which could not be recovered as part of the
costs of the action as directly attributable to their tort or torts. That
these expenses cannot be precisely quantified is true, but it is also
immaterial. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have proved the damage
which is essential to the tort of conspiracy....
Alternatively, this problem could be solved by specifying the avail-
ability of exemplary damages alone and the methods for calculating and
substantiating them in a statutory enactment that gives the right to bring
a cause of action for civil conspiracy. This solution would answer the
point that underlies many of the troublesome issues this article dis-
cusses, namely, that if the cause of action lies in tort then it partakes of
all the requirements of tort law, including the necessity of demonstrating
179. See id. at 574-75.
180. Id. at 575 (footnotes omitted). In Gore, the Supreme Court further noted that in
determining reprehensibility, " 'trickery and deceit' ... are more reprehensible than negligence,"
and that "for Justice Kennedy, the defendant's intentional malice was the decisive element in a
'close and difficult' case." Id. at 576 (citations omitted).
181. See id. at 582.
182. British Motor Trade Ass'n v. Salvadori, 1949 Ch. 556, 569.
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damages. 183 If you call it a duck it will have to have feathers; if you call
it a tort it will have to have damages. So, if it is important enough to
have the action, then let us call it something else.
B. Jury Persuasion
The second suggested use for the concept of civil conspiracy is as a
pleading and rhetorical device for jury persuasion. A claim of civil con-
spiracy can set a context for a case that will appeal to the fact-finder's
sense of justice or, what is often the more persuasive fulcrum, the fact-
finder's outrage at injustice. People react negatively to "ganging up"
when one side of a controversy tries to impose its will on the other by
means of its superior numbers. A "fair fight" is one in which the contes-
tants go one-on-one. When both members of a tag team climb into the
ring on televised wrestling and pummel the lone wrestler from the other
team, the crowd hoots in outrage. "Ganging up" is, in a word, un-
American.
People also react negatively to secret plottings and subversive,
clandestine campaigns. "Sunshine Laws" are intended in part to shed
light on the workings of government. It is considered rude to whisper.
Cicero worked this theme over 2000 years ago in his prosecution of the
conspiracies of Cataline, whom he accused of plotting to overthrow the
republican government of Rome:
For now, Catalina, your hopes must obviously be at an end. The
darkness of night no longer avails to conceal your traitorous consulta-
tions. A private house does not suffice to keep the voices of your
conspiracy secret. Everything is patently apparent. It all bursts out
into the open; you are forced to give up the whole outrageous design.
So do as I say: dismiss all those projects of carnage and conflagra-
tion from your mind. You are hemmed in on every side. All your
schemes are more glaringly evident to us than the light of day.
184
Teachers of trial advocacy emphasize the importance of striking a
theme that appeals to the fact-finder's innate sense of justice and opposi-
tion to injustice. It therefore can be of great use to a plaintiff to argue
the themes of conspiracy: the secret cabals, the clandestine plottings, the
combination of concealed forces aimed at a single victim. It is an effec-
tive variant on the David versus Goliath theme.
To be sure, one can argue in closing argument that the defendants
"conspired," "ganged up on the plaintiff," and "plotted secretly" even
183. See supra 24-25 (discussing Chief Justice Holt's choice of label for the "new" form of
action for conspiracy).
184. The First Speech Against Lucius Sergius Catalina (October 21, 63 B.C.), in MARCUS
TULLIUS CICERO, SELECTED POLITICAL SPEECHES OF CICERO 78-79 (Michael Grant trans., 1969)
(footnote omitted).
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without having pleaded a claim for civil conspiracy. The attorney's
closing rhetoric, however, has more authority when it is tied to an
instruction the court gives the jurors. 85 In the Trial Advocacy course at
McGeorge School of Law, each semester concludes with a jury trial for
all participating students, and the jury's deliberations are observed on
closed-circuit television. During the observations, the jury routinely
returns to the court's instructions. They want to be sure they are doing
their best to follow the law they have been given. Imagine the same
case being deliberated, but in one setting there is no instruction on civil
conspiracy, in the other there is. Assume that the plaintiff's counsel has
argued brilliantly the theme of conspiracy, of "ganging up." In the first
hypothetical setting, the jury will search the instructions in vain for gui-
dance on or echo of this theme; in the second, they will find it set forth
clearly, resonating with and reaffirming the attorney's phrases. On
which case would you like to have your client's interests depend?
As an illustration of the kind of case in which this persuasive use
was employed creatively and effectively, consider Halberstam v.
Welch.'86 In 1980 Michael Halberstam, a prominent Washington, D.C.
physician, was shot and killed in his home when he surprised a burglar
in the house.' 87 After the burglar was caught and convicted, facts
emerged that he was something of a modern-day Pink Panther, but with-
out humor.'88 Bernard Welch preyed on the homes and offices of the
rich and famous. 189 His targets were precious metals, coins, and jew-
elry. 190 He was so successful in his business that eventually he lived in
a $1,000,000 home in suburban Virginia, with a second home in Minne-
sota.' 9' He operated a smelting operation in his basement, where he
melted down the metals that were more sellable in bulk than in coin.' 92
After Welch's murder conviction, Halberstam's widow brought a
civil action for wrongful death and survival. A default judgment was
taken against Welch.' 93 The part of the case pertinent to this discussion
of civil conspiracy was the plaintiff's inclusion of Welch's common-law
wife, Linda Hamilton, as a defendant. The suit alleged that Hamilton
185. See, e.g., CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRACTICE 36 (2d ed. 1995).
186. 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
187. See id. at 475.
188. As the appellate court described it, "This case arises out of the shocking climax to a
coldly efficient criminal campaign that had confounded, frustrated, and ultimately terrorized the
Washington area [,] ... [a] rampage that left widowed the wife of one of the community's most
eminent physicians." Id. at 474.
189. See id. at 474-76.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 475.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 474.
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had assisted Welch in the operation of the burglary "business" and was
liable as a co-conspirator.194
After a non-jury trial, 95 the court found Hamilton jointly and sev-
erally liable with Welch and entered a judgment against both in the
amount of almost $6,000,000.196 The appeal provided an opportunity
for the appellate court to consider the applicability of the concepts of co-
conspiracy and aiding and abetting as sources of joint civil liability for a
less-than-fully active participant in an organization that led to the com-
mission of crimes. From the point of view of fact-finder persuasion, the
case is equally instructive.
The Court of Appeals summarized Hamilton's involvement in
Welch's "business" as follows:
With Hamilton's knowledge, Welch installed a smelting furnace in
the garage and used it to melt gold and silver into bars. He then sold
the ingots to refiners in other states. Hamilton typed transmittal let-
ters for these sales. She also kept inventories of antiques sold, and in
general did the secretarial work .... The buyers of Welch's goods
made their checks payable to her, and she deposited them in her own
bank accounts. She kept the records on these asymmetrical [sic]
transactions - which included payments coming in from buyers, but
no money going out to the sellers from whom Welch had supposedly
bought the goods. Hamilton remembered no mail from dealers in
antiques or.precious metals....
Not surprisingly, given the "low" cost of Welch's materials, his
business was a profitable one. By 1978 [only three years after Welch
and Hamilton first met] Hamilton and Welch had a gross annual
income in excess of $1,000,000. Hamilton's individual tax returns
for 1978 and 1979 reported gross earnings of $647,569.21 and
$491,762.16, respectively, from the sale of gold and silver. She took
deductions, per Welch's instructions, for "cost of goods sold and/or
operations" in 1978 and 1979 of $498,770.87 and $360,000, respec-
tively - despite the absence of any evidence of payouts for such
goods. Hamilton assumed that Welch filed a separate tax return....
After the police apprehended Welch, they obtained a search war-
194. See id.
195. I recognize that in discussing the effect on a jury of the persuasive effect of a claim of
civil conspiracy, I am using a non-jury trial as illustrative. I submit that persuading the judge is
not all that different from jury persuasion. The brush strokes may be different, but the picture
painted still must appeal to the fact-finder's gut instinct for justice. Given that the inclusion of a
conspiracy claim helped persuade the trial court and appellate judges in Halberstam, a fortiori
such a claim would have jury appeal.
196. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 472, 474. Of course, the first question that might spring to
mind is why it was worth pursuing such a claim and obtaining such a judgment against a pair of
criminals. The answer appears to lie in the extraordinary profitability of Welch's enterprise: "As a
result of Welch's innumerable burglaries over the course of five years, he and Hamilton acquired
a fortune that would have been the envy of a Barbary brigand." Id.
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rant for the Great Falls house and discovered Welch's basement
"inventory": some fifty boxes containing approximately three thou-
sand stolen items - antiques, furs, jewelry, silverware, and various
household and personal effects. While Hamilton admitted having
seen the boxes, she claimed not to have seen their contents before.
She said she did not go down to the basement often, although she had
free access to it. 97
Given this factual situation, it is evident that the choice of a claim
of civil conspiracy was wise. Imagine the rhetoric that could be used
emphasizing secrecy, plotting, subversion - the fetid atmosphere of this
anti-social enterprise. Imagine how much more effective it was to talk
of "conspiracy," even to quote Cicero, as opposed to offering a dry
explanation of the law of joint tortfeasorship.
This section concerning the persuasive value of a claim of civil
conspiracy would be incomplete without a look at the underbelly of the
issue, that is, the kind of case that throws in a claim of civil conspiracy
as if it were the proverbial kitchen sink. In Wolf v. Liberis,1'98 the plain-
tiff's decedent sued for the decedent's wrongful death, which had
resulted from the following events:
[Defendant Nick] Liberis and his fiancee, Linda Manno (now Linda
Liberis), had dinner at a restaurant and had a personal argument.
Manno testified that she had several glasses of wine during the meal
and several more after Liberis drove her home. At about 2:00 a.m.
she drove to Liberis' apartment where they resolved their argument.
Because Manno had been drinking, Liberis offered to follow her
while she drove home. Manno took a wrong turn, drove through a
red light, and then lost control of her vehicle at Central and Belmont
and drove her car part way through a store window. Liberis then
parked his car, backed Manno's car out of the window and parked it.
He told Manno to stay there while he went to call the police ....
As Liberis attempted to get back into his own car, he was
approached by three men who attempted to restrain or attack him
... . In the meantime, Manno had left the scene of the original
accident and driven home. Liberis got back into his own car and
began to drive away. One of his assailants pulled open his car door
and attempted to wrest control of the steering wheel, causing Liberis
to lose control and drive head-on into the vehicle driven by plaintiff's
decedent.199
The plaintiff sued Linda Liberis on the theory, among others, that
she was liable with Nick Liberis for tortious concert of action in the
197. Id. at 475-76.
198. 505 N.E.2d 1202 (III. App. Ct. 1987).
199. Id. at 1204-05.
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nature of a civil conspiracy." ° The trial court denied Ms. Liberis'
motion for summary judgment, but the appellate court granted her leave
to appeal.2"'
In reversing and directing a grant of summary judgment,2"2 the
appellate court disposed of the plaintiff's civil conspiracy theory in a
single sentence: "Neither the allegations of the . . . complaint nor the
proofs support a theory of civil conspiracy against Linda Liberis."2 °3
The plaintiff's counsel was fortunate in being spared the embarrassment
of presenting such a claim to a jury. Imagine, for example, the closing
arguments on each side. What "agreement" would plaintiff have argued
Ms. Liberis made with Mr. Liberis, and as to what "unlawful act"?
What "unlawful overt act" was performed by either Ms. or Mr. Liberis
"pursuant to and in furtherance of the common scheme"?20 4 Assuming
that the plaintiff's counsel survived that oratorical outing, consider the
ammunition that defense counsel would then have had. He could have
asked the jury to take the following questions into the jury room for
deliberation. How could Ms. Manno have made an "agreement" with
Mr. Liberis when her blood alcohol level was so elevated that she drove
through a red light, into a store window, and then resumed her drive
home after Mr. Liberis "backed the car out of the window"? After she
drove off, when Mr. Liberis confronted his attackers, how is it that plain-
tiff suggests Ms. Manno "participated" in any of his subsequent acts?
What act did Mr. Liberis perform "pursuant to and in furtherance of the
common scheme": driving recklessly to escape his attackers? By this
time it would be difficult for the jury to maintain its composure and its
respect for the plaintiff's case, when the theory advanced by plaintiff's
counsel was so ludicrous.
The danger of this kind of mindless pleading, beyond its virtual
guarantee of failure of the theory itself, is that its idiocy will infect plain-
tiffs' other, more plausible and persuasive theories. The jury is likely to
conclude that if this "conspiracy" is the kind of justification a plaintiff is
offering for recovery, then every other justification is equally baseless.
V. CONCLUSION
No one should disagree that the inclusion of a conspiracy claim in
the appropriate case might help persuade the fact-finder that the defend-
200. See id. at 1205, 1208.
201. See id. at 1204.
202. See id. at 1209.
203. Id. at 1208.
204. Id. (citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
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ants did something very bad to the plaintiff."0 5 There may be substantial
resistance to the idea of an expanded rule of law to allow suits for unex-
ecuted civil conspiracies; however, such resistance should provide more
reasoned justification than a mere parroting of the dictum-based juris-
prudence reviewed in this article. If the rule is not to be allowed, it
should be because it would be a bad rule, not because Lord Holt said so
and nobody has called his bluff for 300 years.
205. I plead guilty to putting the rabbit in the hat by referring to "the appropriate case." My
justification for the tautology is that otherwise I would have to repeat the analysis set forth in the
foregoing discussion.
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